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Abstract
Future safety-critical systems, used in, for example, the aerospacial, aeronautic and
automotive industries, call for innovative computing architectures, with increased com-
plexity. These systems must still cope with strict requirements, not only in terms of safety
and reliability, but also in terms of size, weight and power consumption (SWaP).
Traditional approaches used in the design of such critical systems, rely on proving and
guaranteeing, at design time, the safety and predictability of their applications. However,
with the emergence of new technological solutions and the increase of the complexity of
applications, it gets harder or even infeasible to prove their safety by design, limiting the
scope and possible features to include in such systems. For instance, the use of wireless
communications opens a new world of possibilities: it may be used to develop smart
vehicles that cooperate with each other to achieve some common goal. However, due to
its uncertainty, the development of such applications for safety-critical systems turns out
to be a challenging task.
In this thesis, we propose a hybrid architecture, in which simple and predictable com-
ponents coexist with complex and unpredictable ones, without compromising safety, de-
spite the unavoidable uncertainty. The inclusion of complex components into safety-
critical systems allows the emergence of new applications that provide new features or
that improve the existing ones. Furthermore, we want to deal with the uncertainty that
characterizes wireless communications and provide mechanisms which allow systems to
cooperate with each other in a safe way.
We rely on a component called Safety Kernel, in charge of monitoring and managing
the runtime configuration of the system, forcing it to adapt to faults and runtime con-
straints in order to avoid hazardous situations. We describe the architecture and role of
such Safety Kernel, and how they interact with other components in the system archi-
tecture, including the functional components of the control system. Finally we present a
prototype implementation of such Safety Kernel over AIR, an architecture based on the
concept of Time- and Space Partitioning (TSP) developed for aerospace systems.
Keywords: Architectural hybridization, Real-time Systems, Cooperation, Autonomous
systems, Time-and-Space Partitioned systems
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Resumo
Os sistemas crı´ticos, usados em indu´strias como a aeroespacial, aerona´utica ou au-
tomo´vel, requerem novas soluc¸o˜es tecnolo´gicas para responder a` constante procura por
novas funcionalidades que respondam aos novos desafios do futuro, tornando-se cada vez
mais complexos. Estes sistemas necessitam, contudo, de respeitar elevados e rı´gidos re-
quisitos, na˜o so´ em termos de seguranc¸a na operac¸a˜o e fiabilidade, mas tambe´m em termos
de requisitos de tamanho, peso e consumo energe´tico.
Arquiteturas tradicionais usados no desenho deste tipo de sistemas crı´ticos baseiam a
seguranc¸a na operac¸a˜o possibilidade de provar, em tempo de desenvolvimento, que o sis-
tema garante a previsibilidade necessa´ria. Contudo, o aparecimento de novas tecnologias
acarreta um aumento na complexidade das aplicac¸o˜es usadas, o que torna o objetivo de
provar a sua fiabilidade uma tarefa a´rdua ou mesmo impossı´vel, limitando as funciona-
lidades passı´veis de serem integradas nestes sistemas. Por exemplo, o aparecimento de
comunicac¸o˜es sem fios abriu um novo mundo de oportunidades: a mesma poderia permi-
tir um conjunto de veı´culos comunicar e cooperar mutuamente para atingir um objetivo
comum. Contudo, a incerteza que caracteriza este tipo de comunicac¸o˜es tem travado o
desenvolvimento de aplicac¸o˜es passiveis de ser usados por sistemas crı´ticos.
Nesta tese, propomos uma arquitetura hı´brida, constituı´da por componentes simples
e previsı´veis que coexistem com componentes complexos e imprevisı´veis sem que isso,
sem que essa coexistencia ponha em causa as garantias de seguranc¸a na operac¸a˜o. A
possibilidade de incluir novas aplicac¸o˜es, que fac¸am uso de novas tecnologias, abre por-
tas a` introduc¸a˜o de novas funcionalidades em sistemas crı´ticos, permitindo melhorar a
performance e servic¸o prestado pelos sistemas atualmente existentes.
A nossa arquitetura assenta num componente chamado Nu´cleo de Seguranc¸a (Safety
Kernel), que tem como tarefa a monitorizac¸a˜o dos requisitos de seguranc¸a e a gesta˜o
da configurac¸a˜o do sistema, assegurando-se que este se adapta a`s limitac¸o˜es observadas e
que podem por em causa a seguranc¸a do sistema, evitando assim possı´veis acidentes. Este
documento descreve a arquitetura deste componente bem como a integrac¸a˜o e interac¸a˜o
do mesmo na arquitetura do sistema, apresentando a implementac¸a˜o de um proto´tipo do
mesmo na arquitetura AIR - uma arquitetura baseada no conceito de compartimentac¸a˜o
no espac¸o e tempo (CET) desenvolvida para sistemas aeroespaciais..
Palavras-chave: Hibridizac¸a˜o arquitetural, Sistemas de tempo-real, Cooperac¸a˜o,
Sistemas Auto´nomos, Compartimentac¸a˜o no Espac¸o e Tempo
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Resumo Alargado
O constante aumento de tra´fego automo´vel nas nossas cidades ou o crescente nu´mero
de avio˜es que diariamente cruzam os nossos ce´us colocam um grande desafio ao futuro
da nossa sociedade. Visto que na˜o e´ possı´vel construir novas estradas, expandir os nossos
ce´us ou construir novos aeroportos ao mesmo ritmo a que o tra´fego aumenta, e´ impera-
tivo desenvolver novas soluc¸o˜es que permitam aumentar a capacidade das infraestruturas
atuais de maneira a lidar com este problema.
Os sistemas de controlo usados em veı´culos automo´veis ou aerona´uticos sa˜o compos-
tos por dezenas de componentes interligados como sensores e atuadores. Recentes desen-
volvimentos tecnolo´gicos no domı´nio deste tipo de sistemas embebidos e no domı´nio das
comunicac¸o˜es sem fios sa˜o um ponto chave no aparecimento de novas aplicac¸o˜es capazes
de fornecer novas funcionalidades e de dar resposta a` necessidade de novas soluc¸o˜es. Por
exemplo, os desenvolvimentos dos u´ltimos anos no domı´nio das comunicac¸o˜es sem fios
permitem o desenvolvimento de veı´culos inteligentes capazes de operar autonomamente
e de comunicar e cooperar com outros veı´culos, capazes de fornecer servic¸os impossı´veis
nos dias de hoje. A importaˆncia da cooperac¸a˜o em sistemas de controlo ja´ foi demons-
trada em misso˜es militares e em redes de sensores sem fios. Recentemente, a sua adoc¸a˜o
em sistemas de transporte tem recebido grande atenc¸a˜o como um meio de ultrapassar os
desafios do futuro. Por exemplo, na indu´stria automo´vel, a cooperac¸a˜o entre conjuntos
de veı´culos permitir atingir uma reduc¸a˜o nos problemas de tra´fego, consumo energe´tico
e ate´ acidentes atrave´s da negociac¸a˜o de passagem em cruzamentos ou da navegac¸a˜o em
grupo em autoestrada. No domı´nio da aviac¸a˜o, a cooperac¸a˜o pode permitir que avio˜es na˜o
tripulados (conhecidos como Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) cooperem com avio˜es
tradicionais, permitindo o seu uso em espac¸os ae´reos partilhados, impossı´vel nos dias de
hoje.
No entanto, as aplicac¸o˜es usadas em sistemas crı´ticos, como sa˜o exemplo os usados
nas industrias descritas, teˆm elevados requisitos em termos de seguranc¸a na operac¸a˜o, pre-
visibilidade e confiabilidade. Tradicionalmente, estes requisitos sa˜o garantidos durante o
desenvolvimento dos sistemas atrave´s da sua verificac¸a˜o, validac¸a˜o e certificac¸a˜o. Con-
tudo, quando se consideram aplicac¸o˜es mais complexas e que usam fontes de informac¸a˜o
imprevisı´veis, como comunicac¸o˜es sem fios, a tarefa de garantir a sua previsibilidade em
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tempo de desenho torna-se difı´cil ou mesmo impossı´vel, o que levanta problemas se´rios
quando se precisa de garantir seguranc¸a na operac¸a˜o de um sistema.
Idealmente, gostarı´amos de tirar partido dos benefı´cios trazidos por estas novas tecno-
logias e funcionalidades, como a cooperac¸a˜o entre veı´culos, com vantagens implı´citas no
que diz respeito ao servic¸o prestado pelos mesmos, sem descurar a seguranc¸a na operac¸a˜o
dos mesmos. Mas, devido a` dificuldade em provar a sua previsibilidade, torna-se ne-
cessa´rio lidar com as possı´veis incertezas e falhas que possam acontecer, pelo que a sua
inclusa˜o neste tipo de sistemas-criticos e´ uma tarefa desafiante.
Ale´m dos requisitos ja´ descritos, este tipo de sistemas possui ainda elevadas restric¸o˜es
em termos de tamanho, peso e consumo energe´tico, obrigando a que a inclusa˜o de novos
componentes e funcionalidades na˜o aumente as necessidades deste conjunto de requisi-
tos. Para fazer face a este problema, as indu´strias do mundo aerona´utico e automo´vel teˆm
seguido uma nova tendeˆncia, cujo objetivo e´ a integrac¸a˜o de mu´ltiplas func¸o˜es na mesma
plataforma, o que permite obter melhor eficieˆncia na utilizac¸a˜o dos recursos disponı´veis.
Neste campo, a adoc¸a˜o de standards como o ARINC 653 e o AUTOSAR sa˜o prova desta
tendeˆncia. Como as diversas func¸o˜es alojadas podem possui diferentes nı´veis de critici-
dade e de confiabilidade, a sua integrac¸a˜o levanta questo˜es no que toca a seguranc¸a na
operac¸a˜o do sistema. Este problema requer mecanismos de contenc¸a˜o de falhas entre as
diferentes func¸o˜es, que garantam que uma eventual falha numa func¸a˜o de baixa critici-
dade na˜o afeta a execuc¸a˜o das demais func¸o˜es. Esta necessidade levou ao aparecimento
do conceito de sistemas Compartimentados no Espac¸o e Tempo (CET), no qual as dife-
rentes aplicac¸o˜es de um sistema sa˜o compartimentadas e isoladas entre si no domı´nio do
espac¸o e tempo, garantido que eventuais falhas sa˜o contidas ao seu domı´nio de ocorreˆncia.
A motivac¸a˜o para este trabalho prende-se assim com a necessidade de encontrar te´cnicas
que permitam a integrac¸a˜o de componentes e outras fontes de incerteza em sistemas
crı´ticos sem que eventuais falhas isso ponham em causa a sua correta operac¸a˜o. Para tal,
esta tese propo˜e uma soluc¸a˜o baseada no conceito de hibridizac¸a˜o arquitetural, que per-
mite que componentes com um comportamento imprevisı´vel coexistam no mesmo sistema
com componentes provados corretos, permitindo tirar partido das novas funcionalidades
fornecidas pelos componentes incertos e sem comprometer a seguranc¸a na operac¸a˜o. Isto
requer mecanismos para gerir a configurac¸a˜o do sistema e garantir que o mesmo adapta
o seu comportamento a restric¸o˜es observadas em tempo de execuc¸a˜o com o objetivo de
garantir a sua seguranc¸a.
Com esse objetivo, nesta tese descrevemos um componente que adicionamos a` arqui-
tetura descrita — denominado Nu´cleo de Seguranc¸a — que devido a` sua simplicidade e´
passı´vel de ser provado seguro e por isso implementado na parte previsı´vel do sistema.
O Nu´cleo de Seguranc¸a tem como objetivo gerir a configurac¸a˜o do sistema e com isso
garantir a sua correta operac¸a˜o. Nesta tese descrevemos a arquitetura e as func¸o˜es deste
Nu´cleo de Seguranc¸a no contexto da arquitetura descrita. O Nu´cleo de Seguranc¸a baseia a
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sua operac¸a˜o num conjunto de regras predefinidas, usadas para monitorizar a execuc¸a˜o do
sistema e reconfigura-lo em caso de necessidade. Descrevemos em detalhe os componen-
tes individuais do Nu´cleo de Seguranc¸a e as interac¸o˜es que os mesmos teˆm com o resto
do sistema. Por fim, com o intuito de demonstrar a sua viabilidade, apresentamos um
proto´tipo de uma implementac¸a˜o do Nu´cleo de Seguranc¸a num sistema baseado na arqui-
tetura AIR, uma arquitetura desenvolvida para a indu´stria aeroespacial que implementa
o conceito de Compartimentac¸a˜o no Espac¸o e Tempo (CET) e que segue a especificac¸a˜o
ARINC 653.
Do trabalho desta tese foi produzido o seguinte artigo cientı´fico, publicado numa con-
fereˆncia internacional:
• Pedro No´brega da Costa, Joa˜o Pedro Craveiro, Anto´nio Casimiro, and Jose´ Rufino.
Safety kernel for cooperative sensor-based systems. In Safecomp 2013 Workshop on
Architecting Safety in Collaborative Mobile Systems (ASCoMS), Toulouse, France,
September 2013
Como trabalho futuro, propomos a implementac¸a˜o do Nu´cleo de Seguranc¸a num am-
biente real, onde sejam testados resultados do mesmo num cena´rio realista, bem como a
verificac¸a˜o, validac¸a˜o e certificac¸a˜o da implementac¸a˜o do Nu´cleo de Seguranc¸a de acordo
com as normas usadas pela indu´stria.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The constantly increasing automotive traffic in our cities or the increasing number of
planes crossing the airspace puts substantial challenges to future societies. Given the fact
that it is not possible to build new roads or extend the airspace at the same pace as the
traffic increases, the throughput and capacity of current infrastructures has to be improved
by other means, emphasizing the need for new technological solutions that cope with this
problem.
Control systems used by individual vehicles are composed of dozens of connected
components such as sensors and actuators each used for a different purpose or function.
Emerging technological improvements in the domains of such components, such as em-
bedded computing, sensing, actuation and wireless communication are key enabling fac-
tors for the emergence of new applications able to cope with the demand for new func-
tionalities. For instance, recent improvements in the domain of wireless communication
are a key factor in the development of smart systems that autonomously cooperate and
interact, being able to provide new and improved functionalities. The importance of co-
operation had already been acknowledged for using in military systems or wireless sensor
networks. Finally, the use of cooperation in transportation systems has received consid-
erable attention over the last few decades as a mean to overcome future challenges. By
way of illustration, in the automotive domain, cooperation between smart cars may allow
a reduction of traffic and fuel consumptions. In the avionics domain, Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) might be able to cooperate with other airplanes, allowing to use these
systems in shared airspace areas with regular airplanes, impossible with current solutions.
However, applications used in safety-critical systems, such as the ones used by auto-
motive, avionic and aeronautic industries, have very strict requirements in terms of safety,
reliability and predictability. Traditional approaches for the design of safe control systems
rely on the possibility of guaranteeing these requirements in design time during the several
stages of the system development. Nevertheless, when considering applications based on
more complex algorithms and using new sources of data such as wireless communication
networks, it becomes difficult to ensure their correctness in design time, which is prob-
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lematic when safety is a fundamental attribute. Ideally, we would like to be able to exploit
the benefits and functionalities brought by new applications such as cooperation between
vehicles, with implicit gains to vehicles as a whole and to traffic, without making any
concessions on safety. But, due to the difficulty of guaranteeing their safety, it becomes
necessary to deal with the possible impact of the uncertainties, for which their inclusion
in safety-critical systems shows to be a challenging task.
Furthermore, requirements in terms of Size, Weight and Power consumption (SWaP)
for this kind of systems also became more strict, rising the need to develop and integrate
new functionalities in such systems without increasing their demand for this set of re-
quirements. To cope with this, several aerospace and automotive industries have been
following a trend towards the integration of multiple functions in the same computing
platform, achieving an optimization in the use of available resources, on which the adop-
tion of standards like the ARINC 653 and AUTOSAR are examples of. As the multiple
functions hosted in one system may have distinct criticality and safety levels, their integra-
tion in the same platform rises safety issues, requiring fault containment mechanisms that
ensure that faults in low-criticality functions do not affect the execution of high-criticality
ones, leading to the emergence of the Time and Space Partioning (TSP) concept.
Addressing the challenge of including new functionalities without compromising safety
requires innovative solutions to guarantee reliability of one system even in the occurrence
of unforeseen failures.. To deal with it, this thesis proposes a solution based on the concept
or architectural hybridization, allowing to have some components that are not proven-safe,
and therefore that may show an unpredictable behaviour along with some others proven-
safe and predictable components, being able to exploit the advantages provided by new
applications without compromising safety. This requires mechanisms for managing the
system’s configuration and constrain its execution whenever it experiences faults in order
to guarantee safety.
For that, we define an additional component to our architecture — the Safety Ker-
nel — implemented in the predictable part of the system that manages the system be-
haviour and ensures safety. In this thesis, we describe the architecture and role of such
Safety Kernel in the context of a hybrid system architecture. Based on a predefined set of
rules, the Safety Kernel monitors the operation of the system and manages its operational
configuration and forces it to adapt to observed runtime constraints.
We describe the individual components of the Safety Kernel backed up by a brief de-
scription of the surrounding system architecture and how it interacts with the remaining
functional components of the system architecture — the components in charge of provid-
ing functionalities to the system. Finally we present a prototype implementation of the
Safety Kernel based on ARINC 653 In Space RTOS (AIR), a TSP architecture developed
with the aerospace in mind, but applicable to other safety-critical industries.
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This work is integrated in the KARYON 1, an European project that proposes a new
perspective to improve performance of smart vehicle coordination, whose objective is
to provide system solutions for predictable and safe coordination of smart vehicles that
autonomously cooperate and interact in an open and inherently uncertain environment.
1.1 Motivation
The present work was motivated by the following observations:
• Current state of the art smart vehicles, such as UAVs or smart cars, are not allowed
to operate in the public air space or roads due to the risk of causing severe damage
cannot be excluded with sufficient certainty;
• The emergence of new technological solutions implies an increase in the complex-
ity of one system, which makes the task of proving its safety and predictability in
design time a hard, or even impossible, task, limiting the integration of such solu-
tions in safety-critical systems.
• Even on proven safe systems, failures may still happen due to unpredictable situ-
ations. Safety-critical systems must be able adapt themselves to unexpected situa-
tions in order to avoid possible catastrophic consequences.
1.2 Objectives
The main objective of the present work is to present the definition, requirements, design
and prototype implementation of the Safety Kernel, a component to be used by safety-
critical systems, that aims at providing predictability and ensuring safety despite the ex-
istence of sources of uncertainty. We present its architecture and an example of imple-
mentation within the AIR architecture. The Safety Kernel must be a trusted component,
simple enough to have its reliability proven in design time by means of verification, vali-
dation and certification.
In the presence of failures, the Safety Kernel must be able to take action to avoid any
catastrophic consequence. This means that, at all time, the Safety Kernel must be aware
of the system’s constraints and, when needed, trigger some system reconfiguration so that
the new configuration meets the observed constraints.
Furthermore, we present an architectural pattern based on a hybrid model composed
of components based on different assumptions and providing different trust degrees, as
well as the integration of the Safety Kernel in such architecture.
1KARYON — Kernel-Based ARchitecture for safetY-critical cONtrol — www.karyon-project.eu
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1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of the work described in this thesis are:
1. The definition of a hybrid architecture for safety-critical systems that:
(a) is composed by both reliable and unreliable components;
(b) allows a flexible and modular integration of new components;
(c) may operate with different configurations, providing different guarantees and
functionalities;
2. The definition of a generic Safety Kernel that:
(a) monitors and looks up for constraints and faults in runtime;
(b) manages the system’s configuration based on such observations;
(c) create mechanisms that enable the cooperation between systems;
3. A prototype implementation of the Safety Kernel using the AIR architecture.
1.4 Institutional Context
This work took place at the Navigators research group, part of the Large-Scale Infor-
mation Systems Laboratory (LaSIGE-FCUL), unit of the Informatics Department (DI)
of the University of Lisbon, Faculty of Sciences, and was developed within the scope
of KARYON, an European project, that consists on a consortium with members from
Faculty of Sciences of University of Lisbon, Chalmers University of Technology, SP,
Embraer, GMV, University of Magdeburg and 4S Group. The main objective of the
KARYON project is, as stated in its mission, ”to provide system solutions for predictable
and safe coordination of smart vehicles that autonomously cooperate and interact in an
open and inherently uncertain environment”, which is achieved by ”investigating new
ways of achieving fault-tolerant distributed control” and with the ”provision of a safety
kernel to constraining system operation in order to avoid hazardous situations.”
As a junior researcher, the author of this thesis was a member of the KARYON project,
having participated in multiple project activities, such as regular meetings for identifica-
tion of problems and discussion of possible solutions, project meetings with other part-
ners, helping in the production of project deliverables and publication of a scientific paper
at an international conference.
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1.5 Publications
The work present in this thesis generated the following publication:
• Pedro No´brega da Costa, Joa˜o Pedro Craveiro, Anto´nio Casimiro, and Jose´ Rufino.
Safety kernel for cooperative sensor-based systems. In Safecomp 2013 Workshop on
Architecting Safety in Collaborative Mobile Systems (ASCoMS), Toulouse, France,
September 2013 [30].
And the following report:
• Ma´rio Calha, Joa˜o Craveiro, Pedro No´brega da Costa, and Anto´nio Casimiro. First
report on safety kernel definition. Technical report, KARYON Deliverable WP4.2,
FCUL, 2013 [10].
1.6 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 - Reviews some basic concepts for understanding the context of the work,
including real-time systems, concepts about safety and how it is handled and guar-
anteed in some approaches emerging both from the civil aviation and automotive
worlds. It is also given a detailed overview over the AIR architecture;
Chapter 3 – Describes in detail the challenges of achieving cooperation in sensor based
systems and the fault model considered for this work;
Chapter 4 – Gives a high-level view of the system architecture;
Chapter 5 - Describes the requirements and the architecture of the Safety Kernel com-
ponent;
Chapter 6 - Presents an use cases system and gives an example of a prototype imple-
mentation of the Safety Kernel under the AIR system;
Chapter 7 - Closes this documents with concluding remarks and some possible future
developments.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 Real-Time Systems
A real-time system is, according to its definition, a system whose requirements are de-
fined in terms of timeliness constraints [27, 45, 41]. In other words, a real-time system
is a system whose correctness is defined not only with constraints in the value domain,
but also in the time one, so that its response and progression must satisfy strict timeliness
requirements. As such, and contrary to a common misconception, the main goal of a real-
time system is not to achieve a high performance level, but rather to ensure predictability
and determinism in its execution. These goals are usually achieved through strict resource
scheduling analysis that define how resources are used in runtime by applications, guar-
anteeing that each application has the needed resources enough time to complete their
actions before their deadline.
The scope of real-time systems is wide, and may go from simple control systems, such
as an oven temperature or a traffic light controller to more complex systems such as the
onboard navigation system of a car or plane or an air traffic control system.
Based on the timeliness requirements and on their impact on the system’s correctness,
three different classes of real-time systems are defined: hard real-time, soft real-time and
safety-critical systems.
A hard real-time system is the system in which no timing failures may occur. As such,
in case of a timing failure, its guarantees do not hold and its correctness is not guaranteed.
Its correctness is hardly dependent on the assumption that all the computations produce
the desired result before their deadline — the instant when the utility of a computation
result drops to zero, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 a). One example of such real-time system
is an on-board flight control system, in which a missed deadline may compromise the
entire system’s correctness.
Soft real-time systems are, in the other hand, systems where occasional timing failures
are accepted and tolerated. Missing a deadline leads to a consequence a reduction in the
utility of a computation result, lowering the quality of the service provided, reaching
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progressively the zero if multiple deadlines are missed. An example of such systems are
online video streaming services, where missing some frames (under a given threshold) is
acceptable, having as a consequence a reduction in the quality of the video provided, but,
as long as the missed deadlines remain under that given threshold, the service is able to
continue its operation without any major consequences. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1 b).
Finally, safety-critical systems are the ones where timing failures must be avoided
but, in case they occur, they must be handled and treated as exceptions to avoid possible
catastrophic consequences. As such, a safety-critical system is the one where a mishan-
dled timing failure may have catastrophic consequences, such as the loss of human lives.
One example of such is an air-traffic control system, where a single mishandled timing
failure may lead to a mid-air plane collision. In this case, the system must be able to,
somehow, handle a possible failure to avoid any major consequences. Figure 2.1 c) rep-
resents this, where a catastrophic event is represented with a negative value of the utility
of the computation result.
Time
Utility
0 Deadline
1
Time
Utility
0 Deadline
1
Time
Utility
0 Deadline
1
b) Soft Real-Timea) Hard Real-Time c) Safety-Critical
-1
Figure 2.1: Real-Time Classes Utility/Time function
2.2 Safety Concepts
Safety is an intuitive concept that may be defined in several different ways, but similar in
intention. When talking about dependable systems, some definitions for safety may be:
• the absence of unacceptable — where risk is the product of the probability of oc-
currence of a failure and its severity risk [21];
• the freedom from accidents or losses [28];
• the guarantee that a given property is respected or the degree to which a system,
upon failing, does so in a non-catastrophic manner [45].
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When designing a safety-critical system, it is necessary to prove and guarantee in
design time that all safety requirements and system specifications will be fulfilled in run-
time. This is done by means of verification and validation of the software and hardware,
through the multiple stages of development of one system. Verification and validation
include multiple techniques such as dynamic and static testing of the system, formal ver-
ification, fault injection and safety analysis [42].
These techniques intend to, according to some assumptions, statically prove and guar-
antee the system’s safety in all cases, even in the presence of faults. The typical approach
to do so, is based on making worst case assumptions and ensure safety (or reduce the risk
to an acceptable level) under those pessimistic assumptions. For high criticality systems,
these assumptions tend to be inflexible and are generally very constrained due to the need
of guaranteeing strict and tight safety requirements.
Besides verification and validation, when talking about commercial systems, it is also
necessary to talk about their certification process. Certification is usually required for
legal reasons, to prove that a system complies with all the requirements specified by the
government or some organization and that is acceptable for a commercial use. Certifica-
tion must, therefore, follow specific guidelines and standards.
In the context of the avionics industry, certification must obey to standard guidelines
such as the RTCA-DO-178 [35] or, in the automotive context, to the ISO 26262 [23] that
define rules and practices for the complete development lifecycle of electrical and elec-
tronic systems. In general, certification is done by analysing the system through all its
development stages and compare it with independent defined safety requirements. These
safety requirements vary according to the criticality level of the evaluated component that
according to the standard may have different levels. For instance, the DO-178 defines
the so-called Design Assurance Level (DAL), whereas for the automotive industry, the
ISO 26262 defines the Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL). These levels are deter-
mined at the beginning of the development of a system and are based on a safety analysis
made for each component that measures the consequences that a failure on that compo-
nent would have on the system’s safety, ranging from the catastrophic to the no effect
levels. Based on the calculated level, each standard specifies the requirements and meth-
ods that must be used to achieve that level and guarantee safety or the reduction of the
risk to an acceptable level.
2.3 Hybrid Models
When designing a system, an application, or simply the solution for a given problem,
it is necessary to clearly identify and specify a set of requirements for that system or
problem, and a set of assumptions about the properties of the environment for which the
problem is to be solved, which has a an implicit impact on the possible solutions [32]. The
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set of assumptions characterize the relevant attributes of the environment for which the
solutions will be developed constituting what is generally denominated as system model.
The system model provides an abstraction of the real system, defines what the designer
can take as granted, and how these properties are provided or enforced.
In a homogeneous system model, the set of assumptions that is made to the system is
global, being applied to the system and all its components as a whole and do not change
over time [12]. On the other hand, hybrid system models [43] represent systems in which
different parts have different properties and can rely on different sets of assumptions (e.g.,
fault model, synchronism) and in which these assumptions may vary with time, presenting
a number of advantages when compared with homogeneous approaches [44].
One simple example of a system well described by a hybrid system model is a system
controlled by a watchdog. The watchdog is used as a safeguard, to make sure that if
something goes wrong in the system then it will be possible to, at least, make the system
stop in order to prevent some wrong or unsafe behaviour. Clearly, while the system is
assumed to possibly fail, the watchdog is assumed to always operate correctly. Therefore,
the watchdog is a subsystem with better properties than the rest of the system, which is
possible because it is a simple component.
For the problem presented in this thesis, we will exploit the expressiveness of hybrid
models to define a hybrid architecture and to design a solution that addresses the conflict-
ing goals of predictability and uncertainty, by merging in the same system components
assumed to be both reliable and unreliable.
2.3.1 Other hybrid systems examples
The Simplex [38, 39] approach proposes this same idea of composing one system with
both complex and simple control components with similar function in order to achieve a
control system with improved performance without compromising control safety. In this
approach, the idea is to “use simplicity to control complexity”, by having two alternative
control components executed in parallel that might be used for controlling some system.
One is designed to achieve improved control at the expense of an increased complexity
of the control algorithm. Other is designed to achieve a basic control, using a simple
algorithm that is not designed for ultimate performance. The trade-off for the improved
performance of the complex control algorithm is that it might not always behave correctly
because it will be more prone to errors that may bring the controlled system to an unsafe
state. The simple algorithm provides the necessary redundancy to compensate possible
problems in the execution of the complex algorithm. Upon a detected failure in the com-
plex one, the simpler one is called upon to take care of the execution of the system.
The recovery block concept [26] follows a hybrid model, where multiple alternatives
for the same function are developed. Before executing the function, the system saves is
state, and executes the first alternative, submitting its result to an acceptance test. If an
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error is detected, the system rolls back to the saved state, and executes another alternative,
preferably simpler than the previous, until finding one that passes the test.
In the N-version programming [6], also multiple versions are developed and executed
simultaneously, whose results are compared and voted, being chosen the one with major-
ity of voters. However, this approach requires to have a majority of correct results, instead
of only one like the recovery block scheme. Still, the Simplex shows to provide a better
reliability when compared with both N-version programming and recovery blocks [26],
when considering that the available resources are limited.
From the Simplex approach we inherit the idea of implementing control functions
redundantly, each implementation with different degrees of reliability and features, as
explained above. However, Simplex is designed by assuming that faults are reflected
on some external behaviour that may be observed by some existing sensor. We, on the
other hand, consider that sensors may suffer from failures that affect the validity or the
timeliness of their data, for which we cannot use directly sensor information to determine
how well the system is being controlled and to decide when to switch the control algorithm
being used by the system.
2.4 Fault Containment
A mixed criticality system is, according to its definition, “an integrated suite of hardware,
Operating System (OS), middleware services and application software that supports the
execution of safety-critical, mission-critical, and non-critical software within a single,
secure compute platform” [7]. This coexistence of functions with different levels of crit-
icality raises the need for mechanisms that provide fault containment that is: that faults
in one application are contained and do not spread to or affect the execution of the oth-
ers, avoiding that a fault in a non-critical application compromises the execution of a
high-critical one.
Virtualization [19, 20] has been widely used as a mechanism to run multiple systems
with different environments (called virtual machines) within the same computing plat-
form. Virtualization provides isolation in the space domain between virtual machines,
meaning that the memory space of each one is independent from the others guaranteeing
that faults do not propagate from one machine to another. However, typical virtualization
solutions do not provide temporal isolation nor predictability, meaning that delays on one
virtual machine may still affect the timeliness of another, not being suitable for use with
functions with real-time requirements. Hence, real-time systems, call for isolation not
only in the space domain, but also in the time domain, leading to the emergency of the
TSP concept, described next.
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2.4.1 Time and Space Partitioning - TSP
The need to provide fault containment in real-time time systems lead to the emergence of
the Time and Space Partioning (TSP) concept [46]. Systems based on TSP are able to in-
tegrate multiple components and to provide fault containment between them by enforcing
segregation and independence from each other, both in the time and space domains.
Time partitioning means that one component shall not affect the timeliness of another.
In other words, temporal failures, such as delays or crashes that happen in one component
must be contained and may not affect the temporal requirements of another component;
Space partitioning is concerned with ensuring that the addressing space memory of each
component is independent and that one component may not access to memory of another.
When combined, these two properties ensure that, in the occurrence of a any failure in
one given component of the system that same failure (and its possible consequences) will
be contained to its domain of occurrence, without affecting the remaining components,
providing the fault containment properties needed by real-time systems. This concept has
been adopted by industries and their standards, as described in the next section.
2.5 Industry Standards
This section intends to give a glance at the Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) concept
and at two main architectural standards used in the avionics and automotive industries:
the ARINC 653 and the AUTOSAR. A deeper view is given in the ARINC 653 since it is
the base of the AIR architecture, explained in 2.6, used as use cases architecture for the
present work.
2.5.1 Integrated Modular Avionics
Avionic systems are composed by multiple different functions, each possibly having a dif-
ferent degree of criticality, a different set of requirements and being produced by different
developers.
Federated avionics are a legacy type of architecture for such systems, where each
function is completely independent from the others, having its own dedicated board with
its own computing resources. This architecture has been historically adopted as a mean of
guaranteeing separation between functions with different criticalities, with the argument
that it would prevent a lower criticality function to affect the behaviour of a higher criti-
cality one. However, the fact that resources allocated to one function cannot be shared or
reallocated to be used by another function, may lead to an inefficient use of the available
resources.
With the increasing number of functions and their complexity present in critical sys-
tems like avionics, the use of dedicated boards leads to an exponential growth of the SWaP
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requirements for such systems.
Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) [1] is, in opposition to federated avionic systems,
an alternative architecture concept for systems that integrate multiple functions, possi-
bly with different criticalities, in a single shared computing system rather than having
individual boards for each function. By integrating multiple functions in the same plat-
form, this approach addresses the needs of modern systems, allowing to achieve a better
optimization and efficiency in the use of available resources, reducing the set of SWaP
requirements and, as consequence, the overall cost of one system. For instance, upon
the construction of the commercial A380 airplane, Airbus declared that the use of IMA
allowed to achieve a reduction of 50% in the processor units and a 40% decrease in the
weight, compared with previous systems [33], which reduces both construction, mainte-
nance and operational costs. The basic architecture of an IMA system may be seen in
Figure 2.2
Figure 2.2: IMA architecture
As the figure pictures, under an IMA based system, functions are split and executed
in individual logical containers known as partitions. These partitions are executed under
a common OS that handles and abstracts the hardware layer, releasing the developer from
focusing on the target platform and allow him to focus on the software, easing develop-
ment and certification processes.
2.5.2 ARINC 653
A prominent example of a TSP system design, is the adoption of the ARINC specifica-
tions 651 (Design Guidance for IMA) [1] and 653 (Avionics Application Software In-
terface) by the avionics industry. ARINC 653 [2] is a standard software specification for
IMA systems that exploits TSP to provide providing fault containment and independent
validation, verification and certification of applications. ARINC 653 has been adopted as
standard by the avionics industry, namely the Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee,
and an example of its use in civil aviation is the software used in the recent Airbus A380
and Boeing 787 [24] aircrafts.
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ARINC 653 defines an interface between software applications and the underlying
operating system layer, called Application Executive (APEX). Following the IMA speci-
fication, on the Application Software Layer, applications are executed in individual emph-
partitions that consist on one or more processes that may invoke the services provided by
the APEX interface or, if needed, may bypass it to invoke specific functions provided by
the underlying core software layer, case in which are called system partitions. ARINC 653
specifies a mandatory set of services to be provided by the APEX and implemented by the
OS Kernel such as partition and process management, inter and intra-partition communi-
cation, time management and health monitoring. Figure 2.3 shows the basic ARINC 653
architecture.
Figure 2.3: ARINC 653 architecture
Time and space partitioning
In order to provide fault containment and to allow independent application development
between partitions, ARINC 653 enforces TSP between partitions.
Time partitioning is guaranteed by employing a two-level scheduling hierarchy: on
the first level, partitions are scheduled by the system according to fixed and cyclic Par-
tition Scheduling Table (PST), defined off-line at integration time that repeats itself over
a Major Time Frame (MTF). On the second level, processes are scheduled inside each
partition according to a local preemptive scheduler. The use of a fixed scheduled on the
first level guarantees that even if a process of one given partition gets delayed, the remain-
ing partitions are not affected, since the fixed scheduled limits the time assigned to that
partition.
Regarding space partitioning, ARINC 653 implicitly ensures it by the concept of par-
titions. However, it does not specifies how it should be achieved by the operating system,
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giving only the needed requirements of restricting applications to the memory addresses
belonging to their own partition.
Interpartition Communication
Interpartition communication aims to support the transfer of information between parti-
tions. Its relation with spatial partitioning implies the use of specific services that transfer
the data from one partition to another without violating spatial segregation constraints.
Partitions communicate through communication channels that define a link between
one source and one or more destination partitions. Partitions access to channels using
predefined access points called ports that abstract the way the information flows on the
channels. Ports provide the required resources to send or receive messages in a specific
channel. A partition is allowed to exchange messages through multiple channels via their
respective source and destination ports. ARINC 653 defines two kinds of ports to ac-
cess a communication channels: sampling ports and queuing ports. Sampling ports are
bufferless in the sense that each occurrence of a message overwrites the previous one. On
the other hand, queuing ports store messages in a FIFO queue, thus, each new instance
of a message cannot overwrite the previous one. Upon the creation of a sampling port,
besides specifying the writer and reader partitions it is also possible define a refresh rate
period: this parameter defines the minimum rate at which the writer should send mes-
sages, which allows to control whether messages arrive at a correct rate in the port or
not. Upon reading from a sampling port, the reader receives a validity output parameter
that indicates whether the age of the read message is consistent with the required refresh
period attribute of the port or not.
These communication mechanisms are implemented by the underlying OS and made
available to applications by the APEX interface that provides the primitives needed for
communication such as create and destroy ports or send and receive messages.
Health Monitor
ARINC 653 also incorporates an Health Monitoring (HM) component that is in charge
of monitoring resources and applications at different levels of the system, looking up
for failures in the system, helping confining errors to their domain of occurrence. Upon
the occurrence of an error (like a process deadline miss, memory protection violations,
or even some hardware failures) an exception is raised and a handler, provided by the
application developer may be executed. Hence, the HM is a fundamental component to
achieve fault adaptability and dynamic behaviour. Faults may be signalized to the HM by
applications or generated by the Operating System or detected by the HM itself. The HM
component is spread virtually in the architecture components to ensure fault monitoring
at all layers, which is why the HM component does not appear in Figure 2.3.
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Extended Services
Besides these basic and mandatory services, ARINC 653 specification - Part 2 [3] de-
scribes some extended and optional services, such as a Multiple Module Scheduler that
allows to define several scheduling plans instead of a single and static one. This mech-
anism may also be used to achieve adaptability, allowing to achieve different modes of
operation instead of having a static one.
2.5.3 AutoSAR
AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture (AUTOSAR) [4] is a standard software archi-
tecture developed by a consortium of car manufacturers and other automotive suppliers
for the automotive industry, with the goal of establishing a standard base infrastructure
for the development of vehicular software.
AUTOSAR allows to fulfil the requirements of future vehicles, providing easy soft-
ware updates, flexibility to integrate and transfer software between different systems, the
use of Commercial of the Shelf (COTS) components and, as a consequence, an optimiza-
tion of the production costs. AUTOSAR provides definitions in three areas; first, it defines
a standard interface for software applications, implying that software may be developed
independently of the target hardware platform and that applications may communicate
with each other in a standardized way, using a virtual bus that abstracts how the informa-
tion flows between different applications.
Secondly, it defines a middleware that specify modules in different areas such as ser-
vices, communication, operating system and hardware abstraction. Furthermore, it spec-
ifies a set of templates to allow exchanging information between different companies.
The top-level requirements for an AUTOSAR operating system include provisions that
correspond, to some extent, to the notions of temporal and spatial isolation [4]. The
specification of the AUTOSAR operating system, however, does not prescribe the use of
strict partitioned scheduling as a means to achieve this temporal isolation among applica-
tions [5].
2.6 ARINC In Space RTOS - AIR
AIR [37] is an architecture for a new generation of aerospace systems designed to imple-
ment and fulfil the requirements of TSP that, despite being inspired in the ARINC 653
specification, aims to improve upon such specification, diverting from it where its limi-
tations can be overcome to the benefit of additional functionality and flexibility, without
compromising safety.
For instance, despite the strict prohibition thereto in ARINC 653, the architecture is
being improved to safely schedule applications over multiple processor cores [17]. Other
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example where AIR diverts from the ARINC 653 specification is related with the Core
Software Layer; due to their constraints, Real-Time Operating Systems (RTOSs) are usu-
ally more limited and use to lack relevant functions that are present in generic OSs. Port-
ing those functions into a RTOS is a hard and expensive task. Motivated by this fact,
instead of providing a single RTOS that is used by all partitions, AIR foresees the use
of a different OS in each partition — called Partition OS (POS) — supporting the use of
both generic and real-time operating systems [16], which allows to provide functions that
were not possible to provide in a RTOS. AIR foresees the definition and use of multiple
PSTs rather than a single fixed PST as defined in ARINC 653 basic services that may be
interchanged at runtime. This feature allows AIR to define mode-based scheduling (e.g.
different phases of a flight) providing a more efficient use of the resources (e.g., by deac-
tivating unnecessary partitions) and also gives support to adaptation mechanisms in case
of timing failures in one single partition [15].
The modularity of the AIR architecture and the fault containment properties provided
by TSP allow to achieve composability property of AIR-based systems: composability
means that properties that hold for individual components also hold after the components
are assembled in the same system, which allows independent component development
and eases the process of verification and validation of software components [18].
2.6.1 AIR Architecture
The AIR architecture, pictured in Figure 2.4 preserves the hardware independence inher-
ited from ARINC 653 specification. It relies on an intermediary Partition Management
Kernel (PMK) that acts as a hypervisor of the whole system, in charge of enforcing ro-
bust TSP properties, hosting crucial services such as partition management (scheduling
and dispatching), communication (inter and intra-partition) and low-level interruptions
handling.
Each partition may host a different OS, called POS, which can be either a RTOS
or a non-RTOS. The POS Adaptation Layer (PAL) encapsulates each POS, hiding the
particularities of each one in order to make them homogeneous and to provide a POS-
independent interface to the surrounding components.
Applications access to services provided by the PMK using the APEX interface.
APEX provides an interface derived from ARINC 653 specification, providing services
such as process and time management, communication and health monitoring to applica-
tions. In addition, system partitions may bypass the APEX to invoke specific functions of
the OS and not available via APEX.
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Figure 2.4: AIR architecture from [14]
2.6.2 APEX Interface
According to the ARINC 653 specification, a standard interface between the application
software layer and the core software layer called APEX provides the basic services to the
applications such as process, partition and time management, communication and health
monitoring. APEX may be used by applications to invoke these basic services or bypassed
by system partitions to access to specific functions of the POS.
In order to support AIR extra features such as mode-based scheduling, adaptability
and online system updates, the APEX base interface has been extended with new services
and primitives [34, 15].
2.6.3 Partition Management Kernel
The PMK is the base of the Core Software Layer, and may be seen as an hypervisor,
transversal to all partitions. It is responsible for ensuring robust TSP properties, pro-
viding communication between different processes and partitions and handling low level
interruptions.
Time Partitioning
AIR follows the two-level scheduling fashion proposed by the ARINC 653 specification
to enforce temporal partitioning (i.e., that one partition does not interfere with each other’s
timeliness), as pictured in Figure 2.5. In the first level, partitions are scheduled and dis-
patched by the PMK, on a cyclic repetition (over a MTF) of a predetermined sequence of
time windows — the PST. The PST is calculated offline and defines the amount of time
assigned to each partition. In the second level of scheduling, inside each partition’s time
window, processes are scheduled according to the native POS scheduler.
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Figure 2.5: Two-level hierarchical scheduling
AIR support mode-based schedules, which means that the system can safely switch,
in execution time, between multiple PSTs that are previously defined and integrated into
the system.
Space Partitioning
AIR guarantees space partitioning between partitions by having separate addressing spaces
for each one and not allowing an application from one partition to access memory ad-
dresses of a different partition. In AIR, this achieved through a modular approach based
on a mapping between hardware-independent descriptors and the hardware-provided mem-
ory protection capabilities (e.g., its Memory Management Unit) [37].
Interpartition Communication
In conformity with the ARINC 653 specification [2], and as explained in 2.5.2, AIR pro-
vides two types of ports for accessing communication channels: sampling ports and queu-
ing ports. Interpatition communication mechanisms are implemented by the PMK layer
and made available to applications by the APEX interface.
The relation between interpatition communication and spatial partitioning implies the
use of specific services that transfer the data from one partition to another without vio-
lating spatial segregation constraints. For that, the PMK must ensure memory protection,
to guarantee that ports belonging to a given partition are not accessed by another one.
Communication channels transfer data between ports, resorting to memory-to-memory
copies mechanisms. Figure. 2.6 illustrates both types of interpartition communication
mechanisms.
As pictured, applications access to the communication channels using the queuing
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Figure 2.6: AIR Interpartition communication mechanisms
and sampling ports provided by the APEX and by invoking the primitives to write/read
(in case of sampling ports) and send/receive (in case of queuing ports).
2.6.4 Mode Based Scheduling and Adaptability
ARINC 653 basic services rely on a a single PST used to schedule partitions, imple-
menting the first level of the scheduling hierarchy. This PST is fixed and defined off-line
at system integration time. AIR goes a step further and, instead of using a single PST,
gives supports for the definition of a set of PSTs. The use of different PSTs allows to
have different scheduling schemes that may be used to provide mode-based scheduling,
adaptability and reconfiguration mechanisms, making the system more flexible and able
to adapt its behaviour according to different needs. For instance, mode-based scheduling
permits the system to adapt scheduling to correspond to a different mode of operation (e.g.
take off, landing, etc.) allowing to make a more efficient use of the resources. Authorized
system partitions may request scheduling switch by using the primitives provided by the
APEX [34].
Furthermore, in [14] it is shown how this mechanism may help mitigating the rate of
deadline misses in the presence of temporal faults of a single partition by assigning extra
time to partitions experiencing timing delays
2.7 Summary
This chapter presented the basic concepts and related work that help understanding the
work performed in the present thesis. First, it introduced real-time systems and their sev-
eral classes, from soft-real time to safety-critical systems. It then gives a glance on some
concepts related to safety and how it is guaranteed by means of validation, verification and
certification of software. We then introduced the concept of hybrid models in opposition
to homogeneous ones and the need for mechanisms that provide fault containment, from
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which we highlight the TSP concept. The chapter closes with an overview over some
emerging architectural standards from the civil and automotive worlds and with a detailed
description of the AIR architecture. The next chapter will introduce sensor-based systems
and the fault model considered in the present work.
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Chapter 3
Cooperative Sensor-Based Systems
3.1 Sensor-based systems
A control system is a component or device added to one system in charge of controlling
its behaviour, typically in an automated way. Examples of such systems are setpoint
controllers in chemical plants, fly-by-wire systems on aircrafts or even router protocols
that control traffic flow on the Internet. Other examples of emerging control systems are
the ones used in autonomous smart vehicles, airplanes or robots, having high requirements
in terms of confidence, reliability and safety levels [49]. Besides computation, control
implies interaction with the physical world, for which control systems include not only
computation units, but also sensors and actuators used to interact with the outside world or
system [48]. The interaction between these components and the environment is a central
concept in control and constitutes the control system loop [49], pictured in Figure 3.1.
Sense Compute
Environment
Actuate
Figure 3.1: Basic Control Loop
Sensors are in charge of sensing and acquiring data whether from the environment
or from the system itself and produce information to be consumed by some component
of the system. Computational units receive data as input (from sensors or from another
computing element), process it and output a result to another component (to an actuator
or another computing element). In its turn, actuators consume information produced by
a computing component and actuate on the system, whose consequences reflect on the
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environment or on the system itself. This basic scheme abstracts the existing software,
hardware and communication channels between components, being only focused on the
data flow and the feedback between the control system and the actual controlled entity.
In this model, we assume that each component is used for a different function, serving
a different purpose. A complete control loop (i.e., the flow of data from sensing to the ac-
tuation), implements what we call a functionality. As such, a functionality is constituted
by multiple functions, each implemented by a different component. For instance, consid-
ering one vehicle: we may implement an Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) functionality
that adapts the car speed based on the relative position to the surrounding vehicles. In this
case, the ACC functionality would be composed by one distance sensor, one component
that extracts information about the position of the vehicle relatively to the surrounding
vehicles, one component that implements a speed calculator function that receives the rel-
ative position as input from the position calculator and outputs a speed, and an actuator
that receives the speed calculated by the speed calculator and applies it to the car. Figure
3.2 represents this basic functionality.
Adaptative Cruise Control Functionality
Distance 
Sensor 
Speed 
Calculator
Engine
Torque
Actuator
Distance (m) Speed (Km/h)Position 
Estimator
Position
Figure 3.2: Example of Adaptive Cruise Control Functionality
3.2 Cooperative Systems
By cooperative systems, we understand a set of independent systems that actively ex-
change data and interact in order to help each other to achieve some common goal, such
as improving their efficiency as a whole, or to realize some cooperative functionality.
Cooperation between control systems has wide range of applications such as military or
surveillance operations, wireless sensor networks and transportation systems [29].
Research about cooperating control systems is not new theme. For instance, in 1997,
the PATH project [11] showed of a group of cars able to cooperate with each other in
order to drive in platoon formation in a closed environment. Due to the technological
innovations developed over the past decade, the research on this area has been a hot topic,
with several new projects being developed regarding cooperation in transportation sys-
tems [40].
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Cooperation can be used to improve the coordination among multiple independent
systems. For instance, applied to the automotive industry, if a set of vehicles is able to
cooperate with each other, they may execute cooperative functionalities that coordinate
them in crossroads or highways, allowing to reduce traffic congestions, improve their fuel
consumption and even avoid collisions or other hazards.
Cooperation may also be used to provide better and earlier sensor data to a system. For
instance, if a set of vehicles is able to exchange data, one may be able to get information
from the sensors of another vehicle as in a remote sensor, allowing it to detect a road
obstacle before it is in the range of its local sensors.
However, when considering safety-critical systems, cooperation entails a major chal-
lenge regarding the communication between systems and the uncertainty that it arises
which may put safety at risk, which we address next.
3.2.1 Communication
When considering cooperation between safety-critical systems, communication is a fun-
damental challenge that must be addressed. Since the ability to communicate is absolutely
required to achieve cooperation, it will not be possible to cooperate when communication
channels are not available or are not functioning with the necessary quality. Therefore,
when considering an open environment, there is a problem when dealing with coopera-
tive vehicular applications. Due to mobility, cooperative vehicles must communicate with
each other using wireless communication networks, which are known to be prone to in-
terferences and much less reliable than wired networks. This uncertainty tends to be seen
as increasingly difficult when considering that, in order to be suitable for use in safety-
critical systems, these cooperative applications must satisfy strict safety requirements.
Our basic approach in this respect is to accept the fact that communication might
not always be possible, devising solutions that allow to safely switch from a cooperative
to non-cooperation behaviour. In other words, when communication is possible, then
cooperation between systems may take place. On the other hand, if communication is
not possible, no cooperation may take place. However, systems shall continue trying
to cooperate again and they will be aware that it is not possible to actively cooperate.
As such, we are interested in the possibility of exploiting the ability to communicate,
while taking care of the fact that it might not be always possible. We thus focus on
the aspects associated with communication and on ensuring safety despite such dynamic
and uncertainty. When communication is not possible, vehicles shall operate as normal
autonomous (non-cooperative) vehicles. Finding solutions to ensure a safe operation in
these conditions falls out of the scope of the present thesis, since it is covered by state-of-
the-art solutions.
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3.3 Fault Model
Many current state-of-the art safety-critical systems such as automotive vehicles are built
based on system models in which components are assumed to be simple enough to be
proven reliable and safe in all domains.
In this thesis, we go beyond these assumptions by allowing unreliable components,
able to perform more complex functions, to integrate such systems. As such, besides
the described uncertainty that arises from unreliable communication between a set of
cooperative systems, we also want to deal with local faults that may be experienced in
local components such as sensors and computing units.
Since we are dealing with real-time systems, we want to cover faults not only in the
quality of the produced data but also in the timeliness of that data. As such, one of the
main motivations of the current thesis is to provide solutions for dealing with the effects
of faults, which are likely to occur when adding complexity to the system. As such,
regarding to local components, we assume the following:
Sensor components may experience faults. These faults may be both in the time and
in the value domain. However, we assume that a basic subset of reliable sensors, enough
to support a basic system’s operation without compromising its safety, is available. This
is mandatory to allow proving at design time the correctness and safety of a system.
The required sensor properties, namely reliability, must be achieved by construction, for
instance, using physical redundancy. Faults in the time domain include crash faults (i.e.,
when a sensor does not provide further output) and timing faults (i.e., when a sensor
produces a late output).
Regarding to computing components, we assume they may experience faults in the
time domain, but not in the value domain. As such, we assume that computing compo-
nents may crash or get delayed. As with sensors, we assumed that a set of computing
components are simple enough to be proven safe and correct by implementation and that
this set is enough to ensure the safety of the system.
Wireless communications are assumed to be unreliable. Communication components
will be assumed to suffer from failures in the time domain, in which messages may got
lost or delayed. As such, no guarantees regarding the delivery of messages may be given.
We do not consider value faults in communication, since we assume that current wireless
communication standards already deal with (e.g., using mechanisms such as checksums).
Actuator components are assumed not to fail. We are concerned with faults affecting
the correctness of perception, rather than the correctness of actuation. Reliability in ac-
tuation may be achieved using redundant actuators but, since failures in the mechanical
parts of the actuators are outside the scope of this thesis, we will not focus on that. As
such, we consider single actuators to be reliable, even if they are actually constituted of
multiple unreliable redundant actuators.
Furthermore, we do not account for malicious faults in any of the categories. To con-
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clude, we assume that all the communications internal to one system are based on a local
network able to cope with high levels of reliability and timeliness requirements, which
is possible to ensure with exiting state-of-the-art solutions; for instance, the CANELy ar-
chitecture [36], combines the Control Area Network (CAN) [22] fieldbus communication
infrastructure with a set of additional mechanisms to achieve high levels of reliability,
availability and improved timeliness, providing the needed requirements.
3.3.1 Quality of data
The precision or quality of the data produced by a sensor may be subject to fluctuations.
For instance, in case of an internal failure or due to some external conditions, one sensor
may produce outputs with a lower precision than it would in a normal situation. Similar
uncertainty may be present in the output of computing elements. As explained in 3.3,
we account for timing failures in computing components, which may have impact on the
quality of the produced output. For instance, considering a component in charge of doing
image analysis, on which at each iteration the quality of the result is improved. If the
component gets delayed and is only able to compute a reduced number of iterations, the
quality of the produced result will be lower than if it was able to compute a bigger number
of iterations.
Besides the variations affecting local components, the information exchanged with
another systems is also subject to variations on its quality. Wireless communication links,
being unreliable and prone to interferences, may suffer from losses and delays, being
necessary to deal with this uncertainty and the potential degradation of the exchanged
information.
In all the cases, since we are dealing with real-time data such as distance, speed or
position that varies over time, it is need to account for impact that time has on the quality
of this data. As such, crashes and timing faults must be reflected in the quality of the
output produced by a component.
In this thesis we look to this problem with particular attention, since these are the
kind of faults and uncertainties that we want to handle and contain. For that, we gener-
alize the problems of failures and uncertainty affecting sensors, computing elements and
communication, by attaching a quality value to each output produced by each of these
components that we call data validity. Data validity represents how good or precise is
the produced output, reflecting the uncertainty present in some components, both in the
time and value domains. To reflect the consequences of the passage of time, data validity
decreases with time, which makes, eventually, the output of a fault component overdue
ensuring that delays and crashes are detected. The way this data validity is calculated is
out of the scope of this work. Previous work addressing this challenge has been presented
in [9, 25].
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3.4 Summary
This chapter started by describing the fundamental concepts regarding control systems
based on sensors and actuators. Later, it describes the benefits of cooperation between
control and the challenges that it presents when considering safety-critical systems. We
presented the fault model that we are considering for this work, focusing on the faults that
affect each type of component. We presented the concept of data validity that represents
the quality of the output produced by each component, which has a major role in the
detection of faults and defining the system’s state, as it will be described in the following
chapters. Next, we will present the system’s architecture, based on a hybrid model, that
reflects the impact of cooperation and uncertain components in the system.
Chapter 4
System Architecture
As described, we are considering safety-critical systems, on which we want to include
components that may rely on a different set of assumptions, have different requirements,
criticality levels and provide different safety guarantees from each other.
We exploit the advantages of hybrid models to define a hybrid architecture able to
integrate these components in the same system, which allows us to include a bigger variety
of components and features when compared with state-of-the-art architectures, namely
those that would have been discarded in approaches requiring all components to be proven
safe and timely in design time. Uncertainty and safety must be managed in runtime to
ensure that no catastrophic hazards take place. Next we describe how we manage these
two opposite forces based on the definition of multiple levels of service and on the Safety
Kernel component.
4.1 Levels of Service
Let us consider any kind of system: one can characterize how good or bad that system
operates based on some metrics that measure its work. These metrics vary according to
the considered system and the intended objective and define the performance of one sys-
tem. For instance, considering an industrial plant in charge of producing some product:
we may consider its performance as the absolute number of properly produced products.
In this case, the best performance level will be the highest output of good products possi-
ble. Other possible metric could be the percentage of properly produced products, which
would also take in account the defective ones. In the automotive or avionics industries,
also different metrics may be used to measure and characterize the performance achieved
by one system, such as the average speed, the time elapsed or the fuel consumption that
takes one vehicle to get from a point A to a point B.
Components involved in the system control loop and the algorithms they execute de-
fine not only the performance achieved by one system, but also its safety level. Ensuring
safety requires some kind of knowledge and assumptions that define particular aspects of
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the control algorithm, such as how fast can a car go or how much distance must he main-
tain from the front vehicle, and also assumptions about the system model and external
conditions. Components (and the functions performed by them) are, hence, proven safe at
design time based on the given assumptions. The set of assumptions made, the resulting
system and the performance that is able to safely provide defines what we call a Level of
Service (LoS). As such, a Level of Service (LoS) defines a trade-off between the provided
performance, the made assumptions and the safety level that it guarantees.
In typical safety-critical systems, the possible variables that influence the assump-
tions made in design time must be well known and all the possible faults that eventually
may happen and that may put safety at risk are treated with some adequate fault-tolerant
mechanism. However, since we want to introduce wireless communication and unreliable
components as a mean to improve the provided performance, the increase in the number
of possible faults makes impossible to predict and handle all of them in design time.
The way we handle this problem, is to consider that each functionality present in the
system may operate in more than one LoS. First, for each functionality, we define a base
LoS, henceforth called LoS 0, composed exclusively by components and functions suit-
able to be proven safe at design time and based on assumptions that are known to hold
in a realistic scenario. This LoS is, in a way, the LoS used currently by state-of-the-art
solutions, providing an ”always safe” base performance level, with no communication,
cooperation, unreliable components or other sources of uncertainty impossible to han-
dle in design time. Above this baseline LoS, we allow the definition of additional LoSs
that exploits the advantages provided by cooperation features and complex components
to provide an improved performance level. Improved LoSs may be designed and imple-
mented based on more relaxed assumptions than the LoS 0, and may be then proven safe
based on those assumptions. For instance, one may assume that the communication la-
tency between two cooperating nodes will be lower than 50 ms, that the reading error of a
sensor will be inferior than a given bound, or that a given component will always produce
a timely output. Based on these assumptions (that may not always hold), the functions
executed under this LoS may be proven safe.
Since these assumptions may not hold, it is necessary to, in runtime, monitor and
check all the possible and relevant variations in order to detect violations in the assump-
tions and, if any of the assumptions of the LoS currently in use does not hold, then it
is need to, somehow, switch the configuration of the system to the highest LoS possible
whose assumptions are valid (which, as a last resort may be the LoS 0). The definition of
multiple LoSs and the use of components with different assumptions reflects directly on
the system’s architecture, presented in the next section.
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4.2 Hybrid Architecture
We design an architecture based on an hybrid model that divides the system in two main
realms: the realm where are located the components that, by design, are proven to be safe,
and whose assumptions are assumed to hold at any time and the realm where are located
all the components whose complexity makes them unsuitable to proven safe by design, or
whose assumptions in which they rely may not always hold at runtime.
For the sake of simplicity, for the next architectural scheme figure, we omit the envi-
ronment and the interactions of the control loop between components, allowing to focus
our attention on the components of the system and its architecture. As such, starting from
the basic control loop presented in Figure 3.1 that contains the basic interaction flow be-
tween the environment and the system, we must make explicit that in fact several control
components (i.e., sensors, actuators and computational units) may exist, each being used
to embody a different need of the system, or just a redundancy mechanism.
As mentioned, we divide the system architecture in two realms, allowing to introduce
and exploit complex components in order to provide additional LoS with an increased
performance. To reflect this directly on the architecture, we divide the two parts by an hy-
bridization line that clearly separates the trusted components (and that provide the base-
line LoS for the untrusted ones that provide the higher LoSs based on more complex
functions and cooperation features. Figure 4.1 represents this architectural division. As it
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Figure 4.1: Hybrid Architecture
is possible to notice, we do not put actuators above the hybridization line, since, as men-
tioned before, we assume they are, somehow (e.g. by using redundancy mechanisms),
reliable and predictable. Furthermore, we added a new type of components, representing
the components used for wireless communications. since wireless communications are
not reliable, we place these components exclusively above the hybridization line. For the
remaining classes of components (sensors and computational units) as stated, we account
for them both under and above the hybridization line.
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We further emphasize that since the realm above the hybridization line is a source
of possible uncertainty, it must be guaranteed that components below the hybridization
line can maintain the system in a safe state, despite the possible misbehaviour of the ones
above the line, and that no fault on this realm may jeopardize the execution of components
under the hybridization line.
For instance, taking a simpler example of the ACC mentioned in 3.1, we may want to
improve the LoS 0, by creating an extra LoS that uses not only information from the local
(and reliable) sensors, but also information from remote sensors of surrounding vehicles.
Furthermore, due to the possible variation in the amount of information coming through
the remote sensors, which may require more or less calculations, the execution time of
the function in charge of calculating the speed is unpredictable. Figure 4.2 represents this
scenario, with two LoSs for the same functionality.
Adaptive Cruise Control Functionality – LoS 1
Adaptive Cruise Control Functionality – LoS 0
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Figure 4.2: ACC functionality with multiple Levels of Service
As it is possible to notice, the LoS 0 is composed by the local sensor, the basic speed
calculator and the engine torque actuator, for which it will execute in a predictable way,
since it relies exclusively on components under the hybridization line. On the other hand,
the LoS 1, depends on remote sensors, with unpredictable timeliness and validity, for
which the speed calculator component from this LoS may be unable to produce a timely
output to be consumed by the engine torque actuator. As explained, in this example there
are two components in charge of producing one speed value to be consumed by the engine
torque actuator. In fact, this situation may happen not only with actuators, but also with
computing elements; this is because we want one component to be independent from the
components that provide him input, allowing to achieve modularity and to have multiple
components providing the same function with a different implementation. In this case,
the different implementations would all be executing and producing different possible
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outputs, each with a different performance or quality associated. From the available out-
puts, one must be chosen to be consumed by components using that function. This choice
must be transparent and independent from the consuming components.
It is also important to note that one component may be used in the provision of more
than one functionality, allowing, to add new functionalities that reuse already existing
components. By way of illustration, the existing distance sensor could also be used to
provide data to the Adaptive Headlight Control functionality that adapts the intensity of
the headlights based on the distance to the front car, as pictured in Figure 4.3
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Figure 4.3: One component used in the provision of multiple functionalities
Furthermore, components may be able to change their mode of operation, based on
some externally adjustable parameter, allowing to have one single component able to
adapt its own behaviour to different situations, without the need of having different com-
ponents for the same task. Each mode may be used to provide the same function with a
different algorithm that may be used to provide a different performance and safety guar-
anties, allowing to adapt the component to some observed constraint or condition. Fig-
ure 4.4 exemplifies this situation, where the speed controller component may be, some-
how, controlled from outside, so that depending on some external parameter, it adjusts its
execution mode.
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Figure 4.4: Reconfigurable Component with multiple modes of execution
As explained, we are moving away from a system with static behaviour to a dynamic
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one, with different LoSs, unpredictable components used to improve the performance of
another and adaptable components that change their behaviour based on some external
parameter. In order to deal with the increased complexity and with all the possible system
configurations, we introduce an additional component to the system — the Safety Kernel
— that we present next.
4.3 Safety Kernel
When introducing new sources of uncertainty to the system, it becomes fundamental to
manage the system’s configuration, providing the means to adapt the system’s behaviour
depending on some observed runtime information. To do so, and in order to deal with
possible faults and ensure that all safety requirements are always satisfied, it is necessary
to add to the architecture a proven-safe component in charge of managing the system con-
figuration, by checking if the safety requirements for the current LoS are being respected
and, if needed, adjust the LoS to a level in which all safety constraints are met.
This is done by the Safety Kernel, which is in charge of monitoring the execution
of system’s components and controlling the LoS in which functionalities operate, forc-
ing the system to adapt its behaviour in order to meet runtime constraints, avoiding any
major consequence in terms of safety. This adaptation shall be done based on some pre-
established conditions and reflected in the system with a LoS switch of the affected func-
tionalities. Due to its role in ensuring safety, the Safety Kernel must be a reliable com-
ponent, proven in design time to behave correctly and timely in all circumstances, or, in
other words, be placed below the hybridization line, meaning that the Safety Kernel will
always operate correctly with respect to the assumed system model. Figure 4.5 represents
the complete system architecture with the inclusion of the Safety Kernel component.
As pictured, the inclusion of the Safety Kernel creates a new information loop in the
system; based on some runtime data coming from the system components, the Safety Ker-
nel checks if the safety requirements are being fulfilled and, if needed, triggers a system
reconfiguration back to the system, forcing it to adapt its LoS to the current constraints.
In addition, for each function implemented redundantly by more than one component,
each one producing an output, the Safety Kernel must act as an intermediary between the
producer and consumer functions, by choosing and forwarding one (e.g., the one with
highest quality) of the available outputs to the consumers.
We envision a generic Safety Kernel, providing services that are independent of the
specifically considered components and functionalities of the system, being independent
and unaware of any specific application semantics. To emphasize this fact, we add an
additional line to the system architecture — the semantics line — under which no ap-
plication semantic exist. This division highlights the different between the functional
components of the system — the components used in the provision of actual functional-
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Figure 4.5: System Architecture with Safety Kernel component
ities — and of the Safety Kernel, which is rather used to provide services to the system
itself. The semantics independence makes the Safety Kernel modular and facilitates its
use and integration in existing systems and eases its development and validation process.
This is why we separate the Safety Kernel from the remaining components of the sys-
tem, making clear this independence and separation of concerns. Still, the Safety Kernel
must be aware about safety constraints that need to be satisfied in each LoS. These safety
constraints, defined at design time, must take into account all the functionalities to be pro-
vided, their interdependencies and other issues that are important when making a safety
analysis, and must be stored in a database of rules that is made part of the Safety Kernel.
4.4 Summary
This chapter described the system’s hybrid architecture. We take advantage of hybridiza-
tion to support the coexistence of components with different criticality levels and that
provide different guarantees in terms of predictability. Furthermore, hybridization allows
us to define functionalities with multiple levels of service, each one relying on different
assumptions, using different components and providing a different performance level for
the functionality they implement. Since higher levels of service rely on more relaxed as-
sumptions, the performance they are able provide is obviously higher than the ones that
rely on tighter assumptions. Due to the uncertainty introduced into the system by unpre-
dictable components, we devise the introduction of a new safe component called Safety
Kernel, in charge of checking whether the safety requirements for the current LoSs are
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being fulfilled and make the necessary adjustments in the system’s configuration to avoid
any possible hazard. The next chapter describes in detail the role and architecture of the
Safety Kernel, as well as its integration in the existing architecture.
Chapter 5
Safety Kernel
This chapter gives a detailed description of the Safety Kernel component. First, we give a
brief overview over the role of the Safety Kernel, its requirements and its relation with the
remaining system. Then, we give a detailed description about the multiple components
that compose the Safety Kernel and the support required to integrate the Safety Kernel
into a system.
5.1 Overview
The main task of the Safety Kernel is to, periodically, evaluate the safety constraints for
the current LoS and to make the necessary adjustments on the system’s configuration, so
that it meets the observed runtime safety constraints. This safety evaluation is done by
comparing two different types of information: safety rules — static and defined at design
time, based on the safety analysis and assumptions of the components of each LoS — and
runtime data — generated in execution time by each of the relevant components in which
faults or a variation on the quality or timeliness of the data produced may have impact on
safety.
Furthermore, we emphasised the need of using the Safety Kernel as a mediator be-
tween components that implement the same function and the components that use the
output of that function.
5.2 Safety Kernel design issues
5.2.1 Runtime information
According to the considered system model, we assume that components may be affected
by value faults that reflect on the quality of the provided data and by timing faults that
affect the timeliness of the data they produce and that flows to other components.
Runtime information refers to the data used to assess and determine the state of the
system that must be collected from the system’s components whose output quality or
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timeliness is subject to changes. As such, every component whose output validity or
timeliness is subject to changes shall send the necessary data to be assessed by the Safety
Kernel. To collect this information, the Safety Kernel implements a set of interfaces to
allow the needed information to be sent by the functional components. These interfaces
are known by the designers of functional components and must be used whenever neces-
sary for the sake of collecting data validity or timeliness information. The details on these
interfaces are provided ahead in 5.3.3.
The process of collecting this data is continuous and periodic. That is, the Safety
Kernel will be periodically collecting this data and analysing it in order to determine
violations of the safety requirements both in terms of the validity and timeliness of the
data.
5.2.2 Design time information
As explained, based on the safety analysis done for each LoS of each functionality, safety
requirements are derived and allocated to system components that explicit the require-
ments that a given component needs to be executed safely.
As such, for each functionality, the Safety Kernel must be aware of the safety re-
quirements needed for that functionality to be provided safely. Hence, the Design Time
Information consists on the information that establish the conditions for functional safety
assurance in each LoS of each functionality. These safety requirements are stored in the
form of rules in a database accessible to the Safety Kernel and refer the bounds of the
validity and timeliness data provided, at runtime, by components whose output quality
must be monitored by the Safety Kernel.
The Safety Kernel, whose role and operation do not depend on the semantics of func-
tionalities, only evaluates the rules using an appropriate rule evaluator engine, which is
generic and not developed for particular rules or functionalities. For example, if a cer-
tain LoS of a cooperative functionality requires that variable V1 is lower bounded by
some value (e.g., V1 < 0.9), then the Safety Kernel will just have to know the bound, the
run time value of V1, and the comparison that needs to be done, in order to determine
a boolean value indicating if the LoS is sustainable or not. The specific meaning of the
bound is irrelevant from the perspective of the Safety Kernel. Nevertheless, the design of
the Safety Kernel requires the specification of the rules format and their interdependen-
cies. The complexity of the rules can vary from a collection of independent checks to a
sequence of interdependent checks of data validity and timeliness information.
Furthermore, the design time information must provide to the Safety Kernel the infor-
mation about how to parametrize components whose mode of operation may be externally
adjusted and information about which components implement the same function redun-
dantly in a different LoS and to whom one of their results must be forward.
As such, design time information, coupled with the runtime information from each
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component, should support the following functions:
• Determine the maximum LoS for each functionality in which the local system is
able to operate.
• Determine how to parametrize reconfigurable components according to the current
local and cooperative LoS of each functionality
• Know which components implement the same function and to whom their result
must be forward.
5.2.3 Adapting the Level of Service
Based on the safety assessment made by comparing the runtime data against the safety
requirements, the Safety Kernel must adapt the LoS of the functionalities under its super-
vision.
When talking about strict local functionalities, which do not depend on any cooper-
ation with external systems, the LoS to be enforced is only dependent on the evaluated
local safety requirements.
However, when we shift for cooperative functionalities, the LoS that must be enforced
may depend not only on the assessment of local components but also be depend of infor-
mation received from other systems. Due to the cooperative nature of the performed
functionality, the Safety Kernel may have to consider the maximum LoS that is possible
to achieve in other cooperating nodes. The LoS that must be actual enforced depends on
the specific functionality and on how it is designed. There are basically two options:
• the functionality requires that all involved vehicles are coherently executing the
functionality in the same LoS
• the functionality assumes that each vehicle may execute the functionality in a dif-
ferent LoS (possibly knowing in which LoS are the other vehicles executing the
functionality).
In the first case, the Safety Kernel must take into account the LoS information received
from other vehicles before locally enforcing a LoS. In the second case, the locally en-
forced LoS will be the one that is determined upon the local assessment of safety require-
ments.
For example, in the case of a cooperative functionality where its LoS is based on
an agreement between the participating nodes, the LoS enforced by the Safety Kernel
would be the highest that can be maintained across all the nodes. Whenever the LoS has
to be degraded in a certain node, (e.g., because this node is experiencing some failure),
this change must be communicated to the other participating nodes and reflected on their
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own enforced LoS. Likewise, in the opposite situation, in which a certain node is able to
operate at a higher LoS, this information is propagated to the other participating nodes
and, if they can all perform in this higher LoS, then the locally enforced LoS is raised.
After determining which LoS adopt, the Safety Kernel must enforce it on the local
components used on that specific functionality by means of reconfiguration so that they
adapt their behaviour to the new LoS. In other words, upon a LoS change in any func-
tionality, the Safety Kernel must know which components must be adapted and which
parameter must be used to enforce that change. In addition, whenever there are multiple
components implementing the same function, the Safety Kernel must forward the output
that fulfils the requirements corresponding to the chosen LoS.
All these operations must be done in a timely manner. Consequently, a change in
the mode of execution of a specific component shall happen within some known timing
bounds. If it does not, that shall be detected by the Safety Kernel that, in last case, may
continue forcing a downgrade of the LoS, reaching, if needed, the LoS 0. However, how
that change is performed is dependent on the applications themselves, being out of the
scope of the Safety Kernel.
5.3 Architecture
5.3.1 Components of the Safety Kernel
To perform its role, the Safety Kernel exchanges information with other components of
the system. The exchanges with different types of components embody different aspects
of the Safety Kernel’s operation, like receiving data validity or sending commands for
controlling the mode of operation of functional components. For this reason, we see the
Safety Kernel as a set of components, with clearly defined and separated concerns, which
are combined to verify and guarantee the operational conditions for safety. For the Safety
Kernel to be relied upon for the provision of safety-critical functionalities, its components
have to be proven to exhibit the necessary reliability and timeliness in design time by
means of software verification and validation. Figure 5.1 schematizes these components
and their interactions. The figure also includes two example functions with whom the
Safety Kernel exchanges information. For the sake of the example, we consider that
function A has two implementations and produces an output to function B and that the
behaviour of one of those implementations may be adjusted from the outside.
For the safety assessment and system’s adaptation, the Safety Kernel collects the data
validity or timeliness information made available by the monitored components, assesses
it and adapts the LoS of functionalities by reconfiguring components according to pre-
defined rules. The components of the Safety Kernel involved in this control loop are the
Rules Database, the Local LoS Evaluator and the Safety Manager.
For every cooperative functionality, since it be may need to agree some LoS with
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Figure 5.1: System components overview and interaction
other cooperating nodes, the Safety Manager uses the result produced by the Local LoS
Evaluator and, possibly, the result from an external component called Cooperative LoS
Evaluator, in charge of agree on a LoS with other nodes. The Cooperative LoS Evaluator
is, however, a component external do the Safety Kernel, which will be described in section
5.3.2.
For the multiplexing task, the Safety Kernel assess the possible outputs and forwards
one to other components. The two component of the Safety Kernel involved in this process
are the Rules Database and the Data Component Multiplexer.
This following sections describe in detail these components.
Rules Database
The Rules Database contains all the knowledge the Safety Kernel needs to execute the
tasks mentioned before. All this knowledge is derived in design time and loaded in the
Safety Kernel’s rule database upon the integration of the components in the system. Since
the Rules Database gives support to different tasks of the Safety Kernel, we define three
categories of rules, each giving support to a different task:
Safety Rules - Rules used to assess, at runtime, under which LoS a specific functionality
may operate. The assessment is done by comparing the data validity and timeliness
information with respect to the bounds expressed in the safety rules. These rules
are accessed by the Local LoS evaluator. As mentioned in 5.2.2, the format of the
rules must support the aggregation of individual rules. A set of safety rules must be
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defined for each LoS of each functionality. One basic example of a rules grammar
that support the aggregation of individual rules, in which each individual rule is a
simple comparison between two values could be defined as in Snippet 5.1. Where
S −→ (S) op (S) | s
op −→ ∧ | ∨ | ⊕
s −→ V alue comparator Bound
comparator −→< | > | = | 6= | ≤ | ≥
Snippet 5.1: Safety Rules
∧, ∨ and ⊕ represent the binary operators AND, OR and XOR respectively. V alue
would indicate the value of the data validity to read, and Bound would be a number
(e.g., a float or an in), with whom V alue would be compared using comparator.
Configuration Rules - Rules used to define the parameters that must be set on each re-
configurable components according to the LoS of each functionality. This is, there-
fore, the set of rules is used by the Safety Manager component to reconfigure the
system. As such, a basic configuration rule would have the structure presented in
Snippet 5.2.
C −→ c∗
c −→ component, param ;
Snippet 5.2: Configuration Rules
Where ’param’ indicates the parameter (e.g., an integer, float, or string) to be writ-
ten, ’component’ indicates where (e.g., socket or port) that same parameter must
be written and ’∗’ represents zero or more of the objects to its left. Besides this in-
formation, each rule shall include as well the necessary information to infer under
which conditions those configurations shall be used (e.g. in which LoS of which
functionality). These conditions may be express with simple rules with similar
structure as the Safety Rules that are coupled with each defined configuration. This
basically allows to, based on the state of the system, reflected by the LoS of each
functionality, define which components must be reconfigured and with which pa-
rameters.
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Multiplexing Rules - Set of rules that give support to the Data Component Multiplexer
component, defining which components implement similar functions, and to which
components one result must be forward. As such, for each function with multiple
implementations, a set of multiplexing rules must be defined. One basic example
of a grammar for such rule is represented in Snippet 5.3.
M −→ P ; C ;
P −→ p, p (, p)∗
C −→ c (, c)∗
p −→ producer
c −→ consumer
Snippet 5.3: Multiplexing Rules
Where ’producer’ and ’consumer’ indicate, for instance, a socket or port to read or
write respectively, and ∗ represents zero or more of the objects to its left (inside
brackets).
Furthermore, for each producer, additional information regarding in which conditions its
output may be used may be included. These conditions may be expressed with rules with
a similar structure as the Safety Rules.
This static information, defined in design time and stored as simple and generic rules,
is the base support for all the operations and decisions made by the Safety Kernel.
Local LoS Evaluator
The Local LoS Evaluator is the first component of the Safety Kernel’s control loop. The
role of the Local LoS Evaluator is to evaluate and assess the data validity and timeliness
information of the monitored components against the Safety Rules. Based on this assess-
ment, the Local LoS Evaluator determines the maximum LoS at which each functionality
is able to safely perform from the perspective of the local node. This result is then made
available to the Safety Manager and to the Cooperative LoS Evaluator components, dis-
cussed later. The basic behaviour of the Local LoS Evaluator is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
Periodically, the Local LoS Evaluator reads the validity and timeliness data sent by the
system’s components and, for each functionality being executed in the system, compares
it against the safety rules defined for the current LoS. If the all the rules are satisfied, the
Local LoS evaluator tries to evaluate the safety requirements for the next LoS, repeating
this loop until some rule in some LoS is not satisfied, returning the highest LoS found
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Figure 5.2: Local LoS basic behaviour
whose safety requirements are satisfied. If, in the other hand, the first assessment is
negative, the Local LoS evaluator will evaluate the safety requirements of the previous
LoS, repeating the loop until finding one LoS whose safety requirements are satisfied
(which, in a worst case scenario, will be the LoS 0). Given that the Local LoS Evaluator
executes in a timely manner, it is possible to know, in design time, how much it will take
to evaluate, in a worst case scenario, from the lowest LoS to the highest (or vice-versa).
This amount of time must be taken in account when designing the control algorithms and
the safety margins established in their safety rules.
Safety Manager
The Safety Manager is the component that, based on the LoS of each functionality, en-
forces a reconfiguration on the components of the system. The Safety Manager supple-
ments the operation of the Local LoS Evaluator, by considering not only its output, but
also the output of the Cooperative LoS Evaluator in the decision of the effective LoS to
adopt.
The effective LoS is then enforced by the Safety Manager by reconfiguring the sys-
tem’s components, making them adapt themselves to the new system’s configuration. Fig-
ure 5.3 represents the basic behaviour of the Safety Manager.
As pictured, the first operation of the Safety Manager is to, based on the inputs re-
ceived from the Local and Cooperative LoS Evaluator, determine which configuration
should be enforced in the system. The actual configurations are specified and stored in
the Configuration Rules that shall define not only the actual configurations, but also under
which conditions a given configuration shall be applied.
The reconfiguration of components is necessary to change their execution mode in
response to a LoS change of any functionality. As such, after determining the effective
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Figure 5.3: Safety Manager basic behaviour
configurations to apply, the Safety Manager propagates the needed reconfigurations by
parametrizing the needed components with the new configuration.
The actual reconfiguration and adjustment mechanisms are then executed within each
component. The Safety Manager just has the responsibility of triggering these changes
on the right components. If, by any reason, some component does not adapt its behaviour
that shall be eventually detected by the Safety Kernel and may have as a consequence a
new reduction in the LoS of functionalities (in last resort, it may be necessary to decrease
the LoS of the affected functionalities to 0).
Data Component Multiplexer
As previously explained, one function may be implemented by more than one component,
producing different results in terms of quality and with different timing guarantees. The
result of a function with multiple components should always correspond to the output of
the component that better satisfies the safety requirements of the LoS of all functionalities
that make use of it.
To avoid any time penalty whenever a component misses a deadline or produces a re-
sult with low quality, all the implementations of a function are executed simultaneously.
For example, considering two components that perform the same function, one with a
complex, and unpredictable algorithm and the other with a simple, and therefore pre-
dictable, algorithm. When these two implementations are concurrently in execution, both
of them produce results with different qualities and timeliness. Whenever possible, the
output from the more complex component shall be used, since it provides a better quality
and may be used to provide a higher LoS. However, if due to same failure that result is not
available, than the system shall use the output produced by the simple component (that
never fails). As such, by having both of the components executing, it is possible to ensure
that a valid output (produced by the simpler implementation) will always be available for
use. If a better and valid result (produced by more complex implementations) exists then
this should be used.
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The task of the Data Component Multiplexer component is to decide which output
will be the result of one given function, discarding the others. Figure 5.4 shows the
basic behaviour of the Data Component Multiplexer. As pictured, for each function with
Data Component Multiplexer
Choose Output
Output 1
Output K
Multiplexing 
Rules
Forward output 
to consumers Output KOutput 2
Output n
Figure 5.4: Data Component Multiplexer basic behaviour
multiple implementations, the Multiplexer reads all the produced values (represented as
Output 1..n). Based on the timeliness and quality of them and on some possible additional
conditions stored in the Multiplexing Rules it chooses one of the outputs (represented as
Output k). This value is later forward to all the components using this result as input. All
the knowledge needed to the operation of the Data Multiplexer (e.g., which components
implement the same function or to whom their result must be forward) is stored in the
Multiplexing Rules database.
This component plays a crucial role to achieve safety in the described architecture,
allowing to mask failures in complex components by using the result of another compo-
nent. Functions that use the produced output forwarded by a multiplexer are independent
from the function before it. The Data Component Multiplexer does not apply to functions
with a single implementation.
5.3.2 External Components
This section describes a component external to the Safety Kernel — the Cooperative LoS
Evaluator — that plays an important role in its operation when dealing with cooperative
functionalities. Since it is external to the Safety Kernel, its description is deliberately not
detailed, rather consisting of the knowledge the Safety Kernel has of these components.
Cooperative LoS Evaluator
For each cooperative functionality, the Cooperative LoS Evaluator has the purpose of
exchanging data with similar components of other participating nodes and, eventually
provide information to the Safety Manager about the LoS of other vehicles.
The operation of the Cooperative LoS Evaluator and the algorithms it uses to ex-
change information with other vehicles is not dealt as part of the Safety Kernel. In fact,
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it is possible that a different Cooperative LoS Evaluator is defined for each cooperative
functionality. Since this component is defined as a complex component (because it is not
possible to guarantee in design time that communication with other vehicles is always
possible), the solutions concerning what it does are varied and depend on what may be
more desirable for some functionality.
A possible approach for the operation of the Cooperative LoS Evaluator is to have
it producing a Cooperative LoS based on an agreement between the participating nodes.
This LoS would correspond to the lowest LoS that is possible at every participating node.
In this case, this LoS would become the Cooperative LoS that is sent to the Safety Man-
ager and used to determine the necessary system reconfigurations . Nevertheless, when an
agreement cannot be achieved, or if a given cooperative functionalities does not require an
agreement on the LoS, the Cooperative LoS Evaluator may remain silent and not produce
any value.
It can be added that, because the Cooperative LoS Evaluator is application dependent,
it could in fact have multiple modes of operation and its complexity can go much further
than what is explained here. Although the Cooperative LoS Evaluator plays an important
role towards safety, it cannot be part of the Safety Kernel mainly due to the uncertainty
in the communication with other nodes. Therefore, it is located above the hybridization
line, outside the Safety Kernel. Figure 5.5 represents a high-level view of a possible Co-
operative LoS Evaluator. Since its implementation is application dependent, the scheme
does not focus on its internal behaviour, but rather on the interaction it may have with the
Safety Kernel components. As pictured, the Cooperative LoS Evaluator uses as input the
Local System
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Figure 5.5: Cooperative LoS Evaluator basic behaviour
output of the Local LoS evaluator and, based on some information exchanged with other
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cooperating nodes, produces a result sent to the Safety Manager. The algorithm used to
decide which LoS is decided outside of the scope of the Safety Kernel.
5.3.3 Interfaces
In order to support the action of the described components, we defined a set of stan-
dard interfaces to allow the interaction between the components of the system and the
Safety Kernel. The primitives that constitute these interfaces are provided in READ—
WRITE pairs, constituting an information flow channel between one writer and one or
more readers. Besides being non-blocking and atomic, these primitives must guarantee
the following:
READ calls - the value that is read is the one written in the last invocation of the corre-
sponding WRITE call; until overwritten, a value can be read multiple times and/or
by multiple readers
WRITE calls - the provided value overwrites the value previously provided by the same
writer
In each pair of primitives, one of the primitives shall be used by the Safety Kernel whereas
the other shall be used by software components external to the Safety Kernel.
The way these information flow channels are implemented shall be abstracted by an
underlying layer in charge of providing communication mechanisms between the compo-
nents of the system and shall be transparent to them. It is responsibility of this layer to
ensure, by whichever means necessary that READs are consistent with the latest WRITE.
Furthermore, READ primitives shall allow readers to know if the read value is still timely
valid or not (i.e. that the time elapsed since it was written is lower than a predefined
delta/timeout). Table 5.1 lists these interfaces, which we describe next.
Data Validity Interface
This is the interface used by functional components to feed the Local LoS Evaluator com-
ponent with the data validity regarding their output. These components must, therefore,
be able to, in runtime, send this data to the Safety Kernel to be checked and assessed so
that when it executes it can determine the LoS at functionalities are able to perform. The
primitives used to support these operations are the following:
WRITE DATA VALIDITY This primitive, to be used by the applications, allows any
component to send its data validity to be checked and evaluated by the Safety Ker-
nel;
READ DATA VALIDITY This primitive, to be used by the Safety Kernel’s Local LoS
Evaluator, allows the Local LoS Evaluator to read the data sent by components
using the previous primitive
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Table 5.1: Interfaces for Safety Kernel support
Interface Primitive Involved Components
Data Validity
Interface
WRITE DATA VALIDITY Functional Components
READ DATA VALIDITY Local LoS Evaluator
Cooperative LoS
Interface
WRITE LOCAL LOS Local LoS Evaluator
READ LOCAL LOS Cooperative LoS Evaluator
WRITE COOPERATIVE LOS Cooperative LoS Evaluator
READ COOPERATIVE LOS Safety Manager
Mode Switch
Interface
WRITE ENFORCED MODE Safety Manager
READ ENFORCED MODE Functional Components
Data Component
Multiplexer
Interface
WRITE APP OUTPUT Functional Components
READ APP OUTPUT Data Component Multiplexer
WRITE APP INPUT Data Component Multiplexer
READ APP INPUT Functional Components
One example of a workflow is pictured in Figure 5.6. In this diagram and in those
which follow, the dashed arrows inside the Operating System represent the provided com-
munication channel, as described in Section 5.3.4.
Cooperative LoS Interface
This interface is used by 3 components and gives support to the LoS management done
by the Safety Manager and by both Local and Cooperative LoS Evaluators. It allows the
Local LoS Evaluator to send its output to the Cooperative LoS Evaluator and also for the
Cooperative LoS Evaluator to inform the Safety Manager of the Cooperative LoS. The
primitives used to support these operations are the following:
WRITE LOCAL LOS This primitive is used by the Local LoS Evaluator to make avail-
able the information about the maximum Local LoS that is possible to safely per-
form to the Cooperative LoS Evaluator;
READ LOCAL LOS This primitive is used by the Cooperative LoS Evaluator to read
the Local LoS written using the previous primitive;
WRITE COOPERATIVE LOS This primitive is used by the Cooperative LoS Evalu-
ator to inform the Safety Manager of the Cooperative LoS;
READ COOPERATIVE LOS This primitive is used by the Safety Manager to read
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the Cooperative LoS written by the Cooperative LoS Evaluator using the previous
primitive.
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In this interaction, pictured in Figure 5.7, the Local LoS Evaluator uses the WRITE
LOCAL LOS primitive (1) to inform the Cooperative LoS Evaluator of the LoS that is
possible to offer by the system. This is read by the Cooperative LoS Evaluator with the
READ LOCAL LoS (2) primitive.
Upon an agreement with other nodes, the Cooperative LoS Evaluator uses the WRITE
COOPERATIVE LOS primitive (3) to inform the Safety Manager of the Cooperative
LoS, which, in its turn invokes the READ COOPERATIVE LOS primitive (4) to read
that value.
Mode Switch Interface
This interface implements the mechanisms to allow the Safety Manager to force a func-
tional component to reconfigure its mode of execution to a different one as a consequence
to a change in the LoS of a functionality. As such, it is composed by the primitives that
allow the Safety Manager to write the mode in which a given component shall execute
and the primitive that allow to read that value.
WRITE ENFORCED MODE This primitive is used by the Safety Manager to recon-
figure a specific component for a certain mode
READ ENFORCED MODE This primitive is used by each component to read the
mode set by the Safety Kernel using the primitive above.
8: Read 
Enforced 
Mode
5: Write Global 
LoS
Function  Component
Function  Component
Safety Kernel
Operating System                                    
Safety Manager
1: Write 
Enforced 
Mode
2: Read 
Enforced 
Mode
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Figure 5.8: Mode Switch Interface
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As pictured in Figure 5.8, this interaction is performed between the Safety Manager and
the different functional components of the system. The Safety Manager uses the WRITE
ENFORCED MODE (1) to inform each component of the mode in which they should op-
erate from now on. This value is read by each component with the READ ENFORCED
MODE (2).
Data Component Multiplexer Interface
This interface supports the functioning of the Data Component Multiplexer. It allows
the different implementations of the same function to make their output values reach the
Data Component Multiplexer. Other functions that receive the output from that function
may then read the appropriate value, which has been previously selected by the Data
Component Multiplexer. The Data Component Multiplexing interface abstracts this whole
process, both to components providing output (which we will call components of function
A for the description of this interface) and to the component seeking input (Component
of function B). The Data Component Multiplexing interface consists of the following
primitives:
WRITE APP OUTPUT DATA This primitive, to be used by applications, allows each
implementation of Function A to communicate its output value to whichever other
functions may need it (including Function B). The value is provided along with a
data validity measure, and reflects the output of Function A at a given LoS.
READ APP OUTPUT DATA This primitive, to be used the Safety Kernel’s Compo-
nent Data Multiplexer, allows the Component Data Multiplexer to read the values
provided by different implementations of a Function A.
WRITE APP INPUT DATA This primitive, to be used by the Safety Kernel’s Compo-
nent Data Multiplexer, allows the Component Data Multiplexer to communicate (to
whichever functions may need, including Function B’s components) the appropri-
ate value to be considered as the output Function A. This value is selected by the
Component Data Multiplexer among the outputs provided by the implementations
of Function A.
READ APP INPUT DATA This primitive, to be used by applications, allows the im-
plementation(s) of Function B to read the output provided by Function A when
needed. Through this primitive, an implementation of Function B may read the
output from Function A without needing to know about the variety of implementa-
tions of Function A.
In this interaction, pictured in Figure 5.9 the Data Component Multiplexer acts a me-
diator between a function with multiple implementations and other functions. Each com-
ponent writes its output using the WRITE APP OUTPUT primitive (1), which is read
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Figure 5.9: Data Component Multiplexer Interface
by the Data Component Multiplexer with the READ APP OUTPUT (2). After analysing
and deciding which output should be forward, the output is written by calling the WRITE
APP INPUT primitive (3). All components of that use this this value as input call the
READ APP INPUT primitive (4) to read it.
5.3.4 Operating System Support
So far, we have only focused on the components of the system, without mentioning the
underlying layer — the Operating System (OS) — in charge of managing these compo-
nents and to provide services such as scheduling. Scheduling shall be done by the OS in
such a way that allows temporal predictability in the execution of the multiple compo-
nents executing in the system and of the interaction flows just described in the previous
sections.
Scheduling
As mentioned, the timeliness guarantees provided by each component in the system may
vary. However, the safety and timeliness guarantees of components below the hybridiza-
tion line must hold even in the event of timing faults in the components above the hy-
bridization line. For this reason, the different components must be scheduled in a way
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which guarantees that the effects of any timing faults are contained in the scope of their
occurrence - i.e., to the component where they happen. The scheduling done by the OS
must, therefore, be deterministic and predictable. We achieve this by scheduling compo-
nents strictly according to a fixed schedule, defined at design time, which assigns windows
of time to each component, based on the demand expected for each component’s work-
load. Each component may, then, use the allocated time window to schedule its own
internal processes according to some local policy.
Since it is impossible to have a schedule that covers the whole system’s lifetime, we
define a schedule that covers a bounded interval and repeats itself over the time. The
length of the schedule — its period — must be defined in order to provide a periodic
guarantee to each component that its timing requirements are fulfilled. Since different
components may require an execution guarantee with a period different to other com-
ponents, the period of the fixed schedule should be the least common multiple of their
periods.
The use of a fixed schedule ensures that, in the event that local scheduling inside a
component above the hybridization line diverts, in execution time, from what was as-
sumed in design time, the temporal properties of other components (which get their des-
ignated window of activity in any case) are not affected.
5.4 Summary
This section describes in detail the Safety Kernel component, used to manage the config-
uration of the system. First, it identifies the main issues that the Safety Kernel needs to
handle, that is, the embedded design information, the runtime information, and how they
are used to assess the LoS in which the system may operate. Besides the local assess-
ment, the LoS of a cooperative functionality may also depend on the safety assessment
made in the cooperating nodes. This, coupled with the local assessment, define the LoS
to be applied to the system. Another identified issue that the Safety Kernel must foresee
is allowing one function to be implemented by different components, acting as intermedi-
ary between components of different functions. For that, the Safety Kernel must read the
output produced by different implementations of the same function and choose the one
with higher validity and that fulfils the requirements for the currents LoSs to be used.
Based on these needs, we detailed the architecture and components that compose the
Safety Kernel, the interactions between them as between the components of the system,
as well as the support needed for the to operate correctly. The next chapter will detail
an implementation example of the Safety Kernel and how it would be integrated within a
TSP architecture.
Chapter 6
Safety Kernel Implementation
Based on the Safety Kernel definition described previously, this chapter gives an overview
over a preliminary prototype implementation of the Safety Kernel within an AIR based
system, detailing all the steps needed from the definition of the system, starting from the
definition of the components and functionalities, safety requirements, configuration rules
and implementation of the Safety Kernel itself.
6.1 Use Case system description
For the prototype, we started by defining one basic use case system composed by two
functionalities; one used for ACC and other for Auto-Steering (AS). The components that
compose the system and their interactions are pictured in Figure 6.1, for which we give
a brief description next. Here we only focus on the functional components of the system
(no Safety Kernel nor Cooperative LoS Calculator are considered yet).
Distance sensor
Assumed to be reliable. Returns the distance to the nearest object in front of the
vehicle with constant precision.
Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver
Assumed to be unreliable. Returns GPS data regarding the position of the vehicle.
Since GPS may not be available at all times, its precision and timeliness may vary.
Basic Speed Calculator (BSC)
Assumed to be reliable. Calculates the speed to apply on the car based on the
distance to the front object.
Smart Speed Calculator (SSC)
Assumed to be unreliable. Calculates the speed to apply on the car based on the
distance to the front object, GPS data and information exchanged with other vehi-
cles (input and output). It has 2 modes of operation (Mode 1 and 2) with differ-
ent performances and requirements that may be externally adjusted by means of
parametrization.
55
56 Chapter 6. Safety Kernel Implementation
Basic
Speed 
Calculator
Engine 
Torque
Actuator
Distance (m) Speed (Km/h)Local 
Sensor 
WiFi
Comm
Smart 
Speed 
Calculator
Hybridization Line
GPS 
Receiver
Auto 
Steering 
Calculator
Steering 
Actuator
WiFi
Comm
Cooperation Data
GPS Position
Cooperation Data
Speed (Km/h)
Angle (º)
Mode: 1 Mode 2
Figure 6.1: Use case system components
Auto Steering Calculator (ASC)
Assumed to be unreliable. Calculates the angle to apply on the steering wheel based
on GPS data and on the speed of the car calculated by the SSC.
Engine Torque Actuator
Receives one speed, and applies it on the engine of the car.
Steering Actuator
Receives one steering angle, and applies it on the wheels.
Wireless Communication
Receives and sends data from or to other vehicles. As described in the fault model,
this is an unreliable components, where no guarantees regarding the delivery and
timeliness of messages may be given.
In addition to these components, due to the cooperative nature of the SSC, we define
add an extra component to the system:
Cooperative LoS Evaluator
Assumed to be unreliable. Uses wireless communication to communicate with
other cooperative vehicles and reach an agreement about the LoS to use by the ACC
functionality. When an agreement is reached, it outputs the result of that agreement.
Otherwise, remains silent.
6.1.1 Functionalities Definition
Based on these components, we now define each functionality, their available LoSs and
the set of safety requirements for each one.
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Auto Steering Functionality
The main components involved in the Auto-Steering functionality are the ASC and the
SSC, where the former receives data from the latter and from the GPS to calculate its
output.
The functionality has two different LoSs available, henceforth called LoS 1 and 2,
whose difference is related with the GPS validity requirements and with the execution
mode of the SSC: when the GPS error increases, to guarantee safety, the functionality
requires the use of a more conservative mode by SSC component.
If GPS is unavailable, if the GPS precision is higher than the required bounds or if the
SSC does not compute a timely output, the Auto-Steering functionality shall not be used.
In this case, we assume that a manual steering would be used in that situation, which
would correspond to the LoS 0. However, for the sake of simplicity, we will not include
this LoS mode in this example.
Table 6.1 describes the requirements and configurations of the two LoSs, where GPS
Validity is the validity of the GPS output (lower is better), SSC Output Age is the time
elapsed since the last calculated speed by the SSC component and deadline is the maxi-
mum amount of the time for which that output will be valid.
So, as detailed in Table 6.1, LoS 2 requires a GPS error lower than 5 meters and a
valid output from the SSC. In this level, the SSC should be executing in the mode 2. On
the other hand, the LoS 1 requires a GPS error lower than 10 meters and the SSC should
be parametrized to execute in mode 1.
Table 6.1: Auto-Steering functionality safety requirements
LoS Requirements Configurations
LoS 2 GPS Validity < 5 ∧ SSC Output Age < Deadline SSC Mode 2
LoS 1 GPS Validity < 10 ∧ SSC Output Age < Deadline SSC Mode 1
Adaptive Cruise Control Functionality
The ACC functionality uses all the components of the system except the ASC and the
Steering actuator, having a total of three LoSs available:
The two higher LoSs, henceforth called LoS 1 and 2, use the output produced by the
SSC component and, besides having requirements in terms of GPS validity, also require
an agreement about which LoS to use with neighbour systems. That agreement is done
by a Cooperative LoS calculator component, located above the hybridization line, whose
task is to agree a common LoS for the ACC functionality with the remaining cooperative
vehicles.
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The LoS 0 use the BSC component, and should be used whenever it is not possible
to use the LoSs 1 or 2. Since the BSC is proven safe and only relies on local sensors, its
safety assumptions will always hold and its result may always be used. Table 6.2 describes
the requirements and configurations of the three LoSs, where Cooperative LoS represents
the LoS agreed with the surrounding vehicles that are cooperating for the functionality,
GPS Validity is the validity of the GPS output (lower is better).
So, as detailed in Table 6.2, LoS 2 requires a GPS error lower than 10 meters and a
valid Cooperative LoS of 2. In this level, the SSC should be configured in the mode 2. For
the LoS 0, since it is assumed safe and all its assumptions are assumed to always hold, no
requirements in terms of safety need to be checked, reason why there are no requirements
defined for this LoS in the table.
Table 6.2: Adaptive Cruise Control functionality safety requirements
LoS Requirements Configurations
LoS 2 GPS Validity < 10 ∧ Cooperative LoS = 2 Use SSC Mode 2
LoS 1 GPS Validity < 20 ∧ Cooperative LoS = 1 Use SSC Mode 1
LoS 0 - Use BSC
The requirements defined in Tables 6.2 and 6.1 are the ones that originate the rules
stored in the Safety Rules database, used by the Local LoS Calculator to assess the LoS
of each functionality.
6.1.2 Configuration Rules
With the requirements of each functionality LoS defined, we defined the configuration
rules used by the Safety Manager to configure the system. The configuration rules are
derived from the safety rules of each functionality and, for each possible configuration,
we define a set of conditions that define whether that configuration may be safety used
or not. Upon the definition of these conditions it is need to take in account any possible
dependency or incompatibility between functionalities.
In this example, the configuration rules define how shall the SSC be configured by the
Safety Manager and the conditions in which that configuration shall be used. Table 6.3
schematizes the result of the analysis of the safety rules of each functionality, defining the
conditions that must be met in runtime (1st column) and which configurations to apply
(2nd column). ACC LoOS and AS LoS represent, respectively, the LoS calculated by
the LoS manager for the ACC and AS functionalities and Cooperative LoS represents the
LoS calculated by the Cooperative LoS Calculator for the ACC functionality. The rules
are defined to be evaluated in order from the first to the last one (from top to the bottom).
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As such, the Safety Manager simply checks these conditions and when finds one condition
that is verified, applies the required configurations.
Table 6.3: Configuration Rules
Conditions Configuration
ACC LoS = 2 ∧ Cooperative LoS = 2 ∧ AS LoS = 2 Use SSC Mode: 2
ACC LoS ≥ 1 ∧ Cooperative LoS ≥ 1 Use SSC Mode: 1
Otherwise Use BSC
As it possible to notice, the SSC component will only execute in mode 2 (the best one)
if the LoS of the ACC (local and cooperative) and the AS is equal to 2. In other cases,
the SSC performance needs to be reduced to meet the safety requirements of one of the
functionalities. As specified in Table 6.3, if at a given moment the GPS precision is of 9
meters, then the local and cooperative LoS of the ACC would be 2 and of the AS would
be 1. In this case, the SSC should be configured to execute in mode 1, which is the only
safe configuration possible for the AS functionality, even if the ACC could be executed in
LoS 2.
For the Steering Actuator, since it only receives input from one component (the ASC),
the communication between them may be done in a direct way, without passing through
the Data Component Multiplexer. If, however, we wanted to add a new component to
provide the same input to the Steering Actuator, that would be done by placing the Data
Component Multiplexer as intermediary between them, which could be easily done just
by changing the origin and destination of the communication channels, without requiring
any change to the application themselves.
6.1.3 Data Multiplexing
In this example the task of the Data Multiplexer and the definition of the multiplexing
rules is pretty straightforward: both SSC and BSC are executed and implement the same
function (calculate a speed) that is used as input of the Engine Torque Actuator. As such,
the task of the Multiplexer is to decide which of the outputs forward to the actuator, based
on the LoS of the ACC functionality (ACC LoS) and on the timeliness of the last output
wrote by the SSC component. Table 6.4 represents the rules used by the Data Multiplexer
Component to choose the correct output.
As schematized, the Data Multiplexer makes its decision based on the LoS active for
the ACC functionality and whether the output from the SSC is timely valid or not (i.e., if
the time elapsed since the output was written is lower than the given deadline). Based on
this simple condition, the Data Multiplexer would just need to forward the chosen output
to the Engine Torque Actuator, which, in is turn, would just read the forwarded value,
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Table 6.4: Speed Calculator Multiplexing Rules
Conditions Chosen output
ACC LoS ≥ 1 ∧ Cooperative LoS ≥ 1 ∧ SSC Output Age < Deadline SSC Output
Otherwise BSC Output
unaware of its original source.
6.2 Prototype
Aiming to demonstrate the feasibility and test the working of the Safety Kernel, we pro-
vided its engineering base on an AIR-based. We composed the system is in four partitions
(P1,..P4), each one running a Real-Time Executive for Multiprocessor Systems (RTEMS)-
based application [31], a real-time operating system for embedded systems that hosts the
described components. As pictured in Figure 6.2, the first three partitions host mock-up
applications of the described functional components of the system and the last one hosts
the Safety Kernel application; We take advantage of partitioning to isolate the unreliable
components from those we want to ensure execute correctly. For that reason, we isolate
the BSC component in partition P2 and the Safety Kernel in partition P4. P3 hosts the
SSC and ASC and the Cooperative LoS evaluator that we know that are not timely safe.
This way, we ensure that eventual timing faults occurring in P3 do not propagate to other
partitions. Finally, we used partition P1 to host one mock up application that simulates
the sensor components (distance and GPS).
The visualization and interaction of the prototype is made using VITRAL, a tex-mode
windows manager for RTEMS [13] that allows us to include a different monitoring unity
for each partition (P1,..P4) and two windows used to monitor the execution of AIR com-
ponents. For demonstration purposes, we interact with the prototype using the keyboard.
We take advantage of this interaction to inject faults in the system, allowing to simulate
variations in the GPS Data Validity and to make the GPS available or unavailable, cause
delays in the SSC execution and change the output of the Cooperative LoS Evaluator.
The demonstration was implemented for an Intel IA-32 target platform and executed in
QEMU, an open source machine emulator and virtualizer [8]
6.2.1 Communication and timing failures detection
Applications hosted in one partition may communicate with each other using the appro-
priate interpartition communication services provided by AIR, already described in 2. We
implement the interfaces described 5.3.3 using sampling ports defined at integration time.
Upon their creation we define the source port, the destiny port and one timeout period.
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Figure 6.2: System implementation over AIR
We take advantage of this timeout period to detect timing failures in the execution of un-
certain components. Every application, upon reading the value on a sampling port value
knows whether that value is still valid or not. This allows the Safety Kernel to know if
some component is executing in a timely manner or not and also allows components to
know if the inputs they are using are valid or not. For instance, in the considered exam-
ple, if the SSC gets delayed and does not produce a timely output, the LoS calculator and
Data Multiplexer will detect that fact and take it into in their execution, which would have
impact in the calculated LoS of the LoS Calculator and in the output forward by the Data
Multiplexer.
6.2.2 Rules Implementation
One important step for the implementation of the Safety Kernel was the definition of
the data structures to support the different types of rules; first, we started by defining a
simple data structure that is used to store a simple comparison between two values. The
snippet of the code used to define this struct is shown in Listing 6.1. As it is possible to
notice, the structure stores two values and an enumerated type that represents the operator
used to compare the two values, being this the support for the definition of the rules and
conditions that will be checked and evaluated by the Safety Kernel.
All the remaining rules used by the Safety Kernel are constructed based on the simple
rule t structure. For instance, the Listing 6.2, shows the definition of the safety rules, used
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Listing 6.1: Simple comparison struct
/* Defines comparators to be used by rules */
typedef enum {
LOWER, GREATER, EQUAL, GREQUAL, LOWEQUAL, NEQUAL
} comparador_t;
/* Defines a simple rule, that compares two values */
typedef struct simple_rule {
int *value_port;
int bound;
comparador_t comparador;
} simple_rule_t;
by the LoS evaluator. We first define a struct, los reqs t that store a set of simple rule t.
This struct is used to store the requirements of each LoS of a functionality. Furthermore,
we define the los calculator rule t that stores a set of los reqs t, representing the multiple
LoS of a functionality. We followed a similar approach for the definition of the conditions
Listing 6.2: Safety Rules struct
/* Defines the set of requirements of a given LoS.
The set of requirements is a set of simple rules */
typedef struct los_reqs {
int n_of_reqs;
simple_rule_t *requirements;
} los_reqs_t;
/* Stores the rules of the LoSs of one functionality */
typedef struct los_calculator_rule {
int n_of_los;
los_reqs_t **levels;
} los_calculator_rule_t;
used in the configuration and multiplexing rules.
In addition to this, we defined a simple function that evaluates one rule and returns
whether that rule is verified or not. The signature of the function is listed in Listening 6.3.
This simple function is used by all the components of the Safety Kernel when are iterating
their rules and with it the remaining development of the Safety Kernel is very straightfor-
ward.
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Listing 6.3: Evalulation function
/* Evaluates if given rule checks or not */
int evaluate (simple_rule_t);
6.2.3 Execution Samples
To better understand the operation of the Safety Kernel, we now present some execution
samples of the prototype. Figure 6.3 shows the overall graphical aspect of the prototype
with VITRAL, where it is possible to see the execution of the multiple partitions.
Figure 6.3: Prototype Sample Execution
In the moment captured by the Figure 6.3, under the Sensors partition (P1) it is pos-
sible to notice the current GPS error (4 m) and the output of the Distance Sensors (10
m). In P2, it is possible to see the output of the BSC component (40 km/h), whose cal-
culation is based on the output of the Distance Sensor. P3 shows of the SSC component
which reads its parameter (2, writen by the Safety Manager) and based on that parameter
outputs its result (70 km/h). Furthermore it is possible to se the execution of the ASC,
whose output are just random values and the execution the output of the Cooperative LoS
(Coop Los: 2) In the Safety Kernel partition, P4, is done the evaluation of the local LoS
for both functionalities (which in this case is LoS 2 for both). Furthermore, based on this
evaluation and on the output of the Cooperative LoS the Safety Manager enforces one
configuration (Enforcing config: 0, where 0 means that the first configuration of the Con-
figuration Rules, defined in Table 6.3 was chosen). In addition to it, the Data Multiplexer
reads the outputs of both BSC and SSC and forwards the latter (70 Km/h). The two lower
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output windows show information related to AIR, such as the partition scheduling and
dispatching and data transfers that support interpartition communication.
In Figure 6.4, we use the fault injectors to increase the GPS error to 24 m (see partition
P1). This, according to the rules limits has impact in the LoS of both functionalities that
decreases to 0 and forces the Data Multiplexer to use the output produced by the BSC (50
km/h) (see P4).
Figure 6.4: Prototype - Reduced GPS validity example
In Figure 6.5, we inject a timing fault in the SSC function that stops sending out-
put (see partition P3) This fault is, eventually, detected by the Local LoS evaluator that
reduces the LoS of the AS functionality to 0. The fault is also detected by the Data Multi-
plexer because, since last output of the SSC is no longer valid, starts forwarding the result
produced by the BSC (40 km/h).
Figure 6.5: Prototype - Timing fault example
6.3 Summary
This chapter gives a practical example of one simple system composed by two functional-
ities that interact with each other and that may be provided in different LoS. We described
in detail all the steps needed to develop the Safety Kernel, starting from the definition of
the safety requirements for each individual component of the system, the definition of the
rules used to configure the system according to the LoS of each functionality. We gave
a glance of how the Safety Kernel can be integrated on AIR-based platforms, and on the
definition that we use to implement the different types of rules of the Safety Kernel.
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To end, we gave some execution samples of the Safety Kernel implemented over the
AIR architecture, demonstrating its feasibility and showing of its execution under the
injection of faults.

Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis addressed the problematic of providing safety and predictability guarantees in
safety-critical systems, despite the introduction of sources of uncertainty in the system.
We achieve this task with the definition of multiple Levels of Service for each func-
tionality of the system, based on different safety assumptions and providing different
guarantees. We manage these LoSs in runtime to ensure that the system adapts its be-
haviour and configuration to the observed constraints and avoiding any major hazard. If
some safety constraint is violated, we reduce the LoS of the affected functionalities, trad-
ing the provided performance for safety. The definition of multiple LoSs opens the possi-
bility to include more complex functionalities, with more relaxed safety constraints, able
to provide features that were hard or impossible to provide with state-of-the-art solutions.
The contributions of this work, described through this document:
(i) The definition of a hybrid and modular architecture for safety-critical that hosts
components whose development was based on different assumptions, enabling the
definition of multiple functionalities and LoSs;
(ii) Support for advanced adaptation to faults that rely on reconfigurable components
that are adjusted in runtime to meet the current LoS;
(iii) The definition of a generic component, the Safety Kernel, implemented as a rule
checker, that provides the mechanisms and support for monitoring safety constraints
and triggering the necessary reconfigurations of the system when any is violated;
(iv) A prototype implementation of Safety Kernel within an AIR-based system.
7.1 Future Work
For future work, we envision to implement the Safety Kernel in a Field-programmable
gate array (FPGA),a programmable integrated circuit hosting a LEON microprocessors
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executing an AIR-based system. The FPGA may then be integrated and tested into exiting
systems.
Furthermore, it should be tested the impact of the solution in terms of performance,
real-time and safety guarantees, analysing the possible pros and cons of the solution in
terms of the desired capabilities and scope of use. Further studies should include the eval-
uation of the safety assurance according to the industries guidelines such as the ISO 26262
or the RTCA-O-178 for the verification, validation and certification of the software and
test its results under realistic scenarios for the automotive and civil aviation industries.
Furthermore, a new trend related with the a new kind of system architecture starts to
emerge is the concept of Distributed Integrated Modular Avionics (DIMA) [47]. DIMA
combines the advantages of IMA and federated architectures, by defining a distributed
system composed by multiple IMA systems that, despite being physically separated, in-
teract with each other as in a regular system. When considering TSPs architectures, this
model corresponds to the concept of distributed TSP systems. By themselves, distributed
TSP represent a new research field, with new challenges and new considerations, imply-
ing the development and study of new solutions able to cope with the same concerns if
terms of safety, robustness and security. For instance, regarding the AIR architecture,
to cope with this new tendency, a new architecture is emerging — the Distributed AIR
(DAIR) — corresponding to the concept of system of systems, in which a set of multiple
distributed AIR-based systems may communicate and interact with each other to perform
their tasks.
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